College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1984

Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice
Ronald H. Rosenberg
William & Mary Law School, rhrose@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Rosenberg, Ronald H., "Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice" (1984). Faculty Publications. 510.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/510

Copyright c 1984 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

REFERENDUM ZONING:
LEGAL DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
Ronald H. Rosenberg*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Local government law in the United States has developed several
clearly defined patterns during the last century. Two of themdirect decisionmaking by plebiscite and localized land use controlare the subject of this Article. American legal policy regarding the
public control of land use has vested power primarily in the hands
of officials in the local levels of government. In the landmark case
of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained not only the general concept of police power regulation of land development but also the validity of regulatory systems
founded upon zoning ordinances enacted by municipal legislative
bodies. 1 Once approved by the Euclid decision, municipal zoning
of land soon became the predominant method of guiding the physical
development of the community. Such a technique, drawn from a
United States.Department of Commerce model statute, 2 characterizes
zoning as primarily legislative in nature with limited provision made
for the granting of administrative relief in situations of special hardship. This traditional conception of public land use control imparts
significant decisionmaking power to elected governmental officials
and public spirited citizens serving on boards of adjustment and
zoning appeals. However, under this system of public regulation,
direct citizen participation is circumscribed severely. The role of
other interested citizens-both landowners and neighbors-generally
is limited to the casting of votes for local elected officials and the
*Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg, Virginia, B.A., Columbia University, 1971; Masters of Regional Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974;J.D., University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, 1975. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law in funding this research project.
1. See 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was prepared and distributed by the
United States Department of Commerce during the early 1920's. 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAw OF ZoNING § 30.01 (2d ed. 1977). This model statute was adopted quickly in whole
or in part by a large number of states in an effort to provide local governments with a
specific source of delegated authority for zoning purposes. By 1925, the model act had
been used by 19 states. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.2 (2d ed. 1976).
This statutory framework was to influence greatly the structure of American land use
control programs thereafter.
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presentation of views at public hearings. As a result, the locally
executed zoning system confers substantial land development control upon a small number of public servants. This structure of land
use control continues into the present day.
Before zoning was adopted as the major method of regulating
land use in the United States, many state legislatures had enacted
constitutional and statutory provisions that encouraged direct citizen
involvement in state and local political decisions. In many states,
legislation empowered citizens both to initiate statutes and ordinances
by direct vote and to review regularly enacted laws by referendum;
popular control of major social issues was emphasized. This movement, prevalent at the turn of the century, received its impetus from
a variety of sources. Foremost was an intention to check the unbridled power of what were perceived to be il).sensitive, incompetent or corrupt legislative bodies.
Shortly after the Euclid decision was handed down, state courts
were presented with issues concerning the application of referenda
requirements to zoning decisions. Even at this point, the incompatibility of the representative versus direct means of land use regulation was noticeable. Although it decided three related cases in the
early part of the century, 3 the Supreme Court finally reached the
federal constitutional issues involved with making land use decisions
by direct vote in the 1976 decision of City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises. 4 The Court found no federal due process deprivation in
a municipal system that subjected all zoning changes to community
ratification by referendum vote. Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, considered this practice unobjectionable because it constituted a local legislative decision by direct recourse to the electorate. The Chief Justice thought it inconceivable that such a procedure could be an improper delegation of legislative power given
that the voters were the source of local legislative authority. By embracing this interpretation of referendum theory and by rejecting
the pragmatic considerations raised by Justice Stevens in dissent, 5
the majority endorsed a practice with the potential to overturn the
conventional methods of regulating land development.
This Article examines the phenomenon of referendum zoning from
the standpoint of both emerging legal doctrine and empirical analysis.
Part II reviews the historical development of referenda and the
3.
Cusack
4.
5.

Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas
Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
426 u.s. 668 (1976).
!d. at 680-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court's generally supportive view of plebiscite decisionmaking. Next, the Eastlake case is discussed, focusing upon the
Supreme Court's rationale for upholding this form of direct
policymaking. Part III evaluates the response of state courts on
referendum zoning cases following the Eastlake opinion. Finally, part
IV analyzes data concerning land use referenda in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, comparing actual experience with the judicial assumptions appearing in reported decisions. Conclusions then follow with
respect to the desirability of incorporating referendum zomng as
a feature of the municipal land use control system.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF REFERENDA

The Development of the Plebiscite in America

American political development has produced a system of
representative decisionmaking by popularly elected officials. Following the American Revolution, state and local governments followed
the legislative model established on the federal level by the United
States Constitution. The pervasive pattern of the nineteenth cen- .
tury was to centralize political power and the prerogative to make
socially important decisions in the state legislatures. 6 This fact, in
part, is reflected by statutory construction rules that were devised
. to limit the freedom of action of municipal corporations. 7 As the
century progressed, however, the needs of the rapidly expanding
urban areas required that cities be granted power to deal effectively
with their emerging problems. This trend, coupled with the growing political power of the cities, aided the development of the home

6. See 2 E. McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 4.02 (3d ed. 1979).
In Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901), Judge Mitchell stated the
following general principles:
Municipal corporations are agents of the state, invested with certain subordinate
governmental functions for reasons of convenience and public policy. They are
created, governed, and the extent of their powers determined by the legislature,
and subject to change, repeal, or total abolition at its will. They have no vested
rights in their offices, their charters, their corporate powers, or even their corporate existence. This is the universal rule of constitutional law, and in no state
has it been more clearly expressed and more uniformly applied than in
Pennsylvania.
/d. at 541, 49 A. at 352.
7. See 1 J. DILLON, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 89 (5th ed. 1911).
Quoting Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, Judge Dillon stated: ''[Municipal corporations] can exercise no powers but those which are conferred upon them by the act by
which they are constituted, or such as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers,
the performance of their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of their
association." Spaulding v. Lowell, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 71, 74 (1839).
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rule doctrine, resulting in increased municipal self-determination. 8
Yet as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the movement supporting the citizens' right to decide important state and local issues
by plebiscite rapidly grew in popularity. 9
The drafters of the United States Constitution made no explicit
provision for democratic decisionmaking by direct vote. 10 Although
the Declaration of Independence recognized the source of government legitimacy to be the consent of the citizenry, there was a reluctance to create a "pure democracy." 11 The constitutional theorists
expressed a fear that direct democracy-especially during a period
of limited voting franchise-could lead to a tyranny of majoritarian
rule. 12 As a matter of federal law, the Constitution granted citizens
a right to live under a republican form of government. 13 Both
Madison and Jefferson similarly construed the meaning of
"republican": a representational form of government in which the
citizens directly elect officials to make individual legislative and
executive judgments. 14

8. See 2 E. McQuiLLIN, supra note 6, § 9.08. The idea of local self-governance through
home rule charters was initiated by an 1875 amendment to the Missouri Constitution.
See Mo. CaNST. art. VI, § 19. For a list of states having constitutional provisions for home
rule charters, see I E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 3.21 (3d
ed. 1979). See generally C. RHYNE, MuNICIPAL LAW § 4-3 (1957).
9. See, e.g., J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL
IN OREGON 3-5 (1915). A complete listing of state initiative and referenda provisions appears
in REFERENDUMS: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY, 69-70 (D. Butler
& A. Ranney eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as CoMPARATIVE STUDY].
10. In fact, most of the original state constitutions framed during the revolutionary
period were not approved by referenda. Only in New Hampshire and Massachusetts did
the citizens have an opportunity to vote directly on their state constitutions. See E.
OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 106-7 (1912).
11. In The Federalist, James Madison wrote:
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of
no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements
to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such
democracies have ever been found . . . incompatible with personal security or
the rights of property . . . .
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 Q. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966).
12. /d.
13. U.S. CaNsT. art. IV, § 4.
14. In 1816, Jefferson defined the term "republic" in the following way:
Indeed, it must be acknowledged, that the term republic is of very vague application in every language . . . . Were I to assign to this term a precise and definite
idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in
mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority;
and that every other government is more or less republican, in proportion as it
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While direct voter decisionmaking was not incorporated into
national political doctrine, it was a feature of local government as
early as the 'seventeenth century. The New England town meeting
frequently has been hailed as the forerunner of the local plebiscite. 15
Another antecedent to the modern referendum was the adoption
has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the
citizens.
15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 19 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 39 0. Madison).
15. An early treatise on the law of municipal corporations described the New England
town meeting as follows:
A New England town is the best modern representative of a pure democracy.
All the qualified voters of the territory are members of the corporation, and meet
at certain periods as a general assembly for the transaction of the business of the
community. The representative system.is not used, and each voter is entitled to
participate personally in the work of government. The regular annual sessions
are presided over by a moderator and are attended by the town officers, .who render
their accounts for the year and their estimates of the money required for the ensuing year. The meeting approves or disapproves of the action of its officers and
elects their successors. The organization of the towns is not entirely uniform. The
officers are commonly selectmen; a town clerk, a treasurer, a collector of taxes,
assessor, a school committee, and such other minor officers as constables, library
trustees and surveyors of highways. All the executive functions of local government are in the hands of these officials, governed largely by general statutes. The
ta~es for the payment of county expenses are apportioned by the counties, but
are raised by the towns.
C. ELLIOTT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE,LAW OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 18 (3d ed. 1925).
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter. , Chief Justice Burger considered the town meeting,
along with the idea of a referendum, to be "a means for direct political participation."
426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976). But the Chief justice's description of the town meeting as "both
a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes,'' id., has evoked challenge by
historians. Rather than reflecting true participatory democracy, the town meeting merits
description not as a public forum for the resolution of conflicting social views and Interests but instead as a community demonstration of consensus.
For example, Professor Michael Zuckerman notes that:
The town meeting had one prime purpose;and it was not the provision of a neutral
battleground for the clash of contending parties or interest groups. In fact, nothing
could have been more remote from the minds of men who repeatedly affirmed,
to the very end of the provincial period, that ''harmony and unanimity'' were
what ''they most heartily wish to enjoy in all their public concerns.''
Zuckerman, The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 539
(1968).
The town meeting did not encourage spirited advocacy of interest among competing
groups; decisions reached at the town meeting reflected the thoughts of a limited segment
of homogenous citizens, those possessing the voting franchise. Colonial New England was
largely of uniform racial, national and cultural characteristics. Its citizens were mostly
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants with very few Germans, Irish, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, French
Catholics, Blacks and Native Americans. See Zuckerman, supra, at 538.
Thus, colonial New England was not a pluralistic, democratic society in ·the current
sense of the term. Given these differing social compositions and traditions, it is inappropriate
to cite the New England town meeting as a model for direct democratic decisionmaking
at the local level of government.
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of state legislation that authorized local option laws. During the nineteenth century, state legislatures wishing to avoid divisive subjects,
particularly those with both economic and moral repercussions,
granted local governments the power to submit a limited· range of
questions to voters. 16 Most commonly the local option principle was
applied to the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. 17 Other
topics subject to this form of local control were community fencing
rules, oyster harvesting methods, Sunday "blue laws" and the use
of automated voting machines. 18
As a precursor of general referendum and initiative power, the
local option incurred the same criticism currently leveled at its
modern-day descendant. In Rice v. Foster, decided in 1847, the
Delaware Court of Errors and Appeals invalidated that state's local
option liquor statute and described it as representing a policy that
would ''demolish the whole frame and texture of our republican
form of government, and prostrate every thing to the worse species
of tyranny and despotism, the ever varying will of an irresponsible
multitude. " 19 Despite such early disapproval, this method of local
decisionmaking continues into the twentieth century and applies to
an increasingly broad range of activities. 20

16, Local option schemes were used as a method of dealing with proposals "essentially of a disagreeable and vexing character." E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 286.
Oberholtzer neatly described the attitude of the authorizing legislature:
The legislature hesitates either to enact or to refuse to enact a certain measure.
It would be criticized by partisans no matter what policy it should adopt. The
legislators say then to the people: "We will refer this question to you. You elect
us and we represent you. In this matter we will submit the law directly to you
and if you are in favor of it you may pass it; if, however, you are opposed to
it you will reject it. In any case you cannot blame us."
!d. Described in this fashion, the local option principle represents an abdication of political
responsibility for controversial subjects primarily affecting the local level. This form of
limited power delegation merits comparison with a general policy of centralized state
legislative authority. See 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW 75-77
(1982).
17. See C. ELLIOTT, supra note 15, § 321; E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 288.
18. See E. Oberholtzer, supra note 10, at 286-310.
19. 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 489 (1847). Compare Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake,
41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324 N .E.2d 740, 746 (1975) (Brown, J .) ("Due process of law
. . . 'requires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of
municipal power, by assuring that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise
of that power are articulated by some responsible organ of municipal government."), rev 'd,
426 U.S. 668 (1976).
,
20. 0. REYNOLDs, supra note 16, at 91 n.18. One limitation on the local option method
of state legislation has been the restriction in some state constitutions against special or
local legislation. See 1 C. SANDS & H. LIBONATI, LocAL GovERNMENT LAw§ 3.35 (1981).
This position is contrary to the general rule upholding such legislation .

..
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The development of the initiative and referendum devices as a
widespread feature of local government law accelerated at the end
of the nineteenth century. From the beginning of the union, states
have adopted and amended their constitutions by the use of
referenda. 21 Interest in the use of referenda and initiatives for state
and local legislative issues, however, has taken longer to develop.
At the urging of the Populist and Progressive parties and the combined support of organized labor, a movement-intended to cleanse
state politics of the control by political bosses and special interest
groups- 22 began in the 1890's to encourage the spread of direct local
legislation. 23
In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to provide, by constitutional amendment, for statewide statutory initiatives and
referenda. 24 Within four years, Utah and Oregon followed suit.
During the period from 1906 to 1918, nineteen more states joined
these original three. 25 As of 1978, thirty-nine states allow statutory
referenda, and twenty-three permit state legislation by initiative. 26
21. Massachusetts (1777), New Hampshire (1779), Rhode Island (1788), Maine (1816),
Mississippi (1817), Connecticut (1818) and Alabama (1819) employed constitutional re·
ferenda. See CoMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 9, at 68·69. Today all states except Delaware
require referendum approval of constitutional modifications. !d. at 69.
22. J. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 4.
23. See Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y. U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 109-10 & n.130 (1977); see also Comment, Judicial Review
of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. REv. 175, 178 n.20 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Popular Vote].
The wellspring of this movement was not indigenous to the United States. The model
for the American direct legislation movement was based on the Swiss experience, dating
back to the Middle Ages. See E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 100; Comment, Popular
Vote, supra, at 177. Apparently the Swiss referendum was used as early as 1309. See L.
TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL PRocEss 10 (1977). However, there are other instances of direct group decisionmaking that are far more ancient. See Shafer, A Teutonic Institution Revived: The Referendum, 22 YALE L.J. 398, 398-400 (1913); Comment, Popular Vote, supra, at 176.
In Switzerland, direct votes were taken on both national constitutional subjects, such
as the Second Helvetic Constitution, and local issues at the canton level. The Swiss theory
of direct democratic action initially gained adherents from the western United States.
24. The constitutional amendment was passed by the South Dakota legislature in 1897
and was adopted by the citizens, one year later, by a vote of23,816 to 16,483. The system
allowed citizens to initiate state statutes and to review· existing legislation. The amend·
ment denied the governor veto power over the referendum or initiative result. See E.
OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 392-93. The first referendum was not conducted until
1908 when voters considered four issues: (1) a local option liquor law; (2) a bill to curb
the practices of divorce lawyers; (3) a law prohibiting theatrical performances on Sunday;
and ( 4) a bill prohibiting the killing of quail for five years. All were successful except
the local option liquor law. /d. at 394.
25. CoMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 9, at 69.
26. !d. at 70.
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Local government referenda are provided for in thirty-nine states 27
and are used frequently. One estimate has placed the national total
number of local referenda at ten to fifteen thousand annually. 28 The
subject matter of these referenda has varied, encompassing, for instance, tax and financing measures, fluoridation of municipal water
supplies, anti-discrimination ordinances and school desegregation
matters. 29
B.

The Supreme Court's View of Referenda and Initiatives

With the rise of direct legislation techniques at the state and local
level of government, it was inevitable that the Supreme Court of
the United States would be asked to consider challenges to their
use. Cases involving referenda and initiatives, typically deciding
questions of great public iT).terest, may be categorized into three
groups. The first involves early cases challenging referendum legislation, which presumably denies a republican form of government,
as violative of the guarantee clause of the Constitution. The second
group encompasses decisions examining the notion of voting rights
in referendum elections. Finally, a third group contains an evaluation of the substantive outcomes resulting from the referenda.
1.

The Guarantee Clause Cases

The initial surge of interest in local referenda occurred primarily
in the western states at the end of the nineteenth century. 30 Shortly
after use of local referenda became an option, litigation arose
challenging this method of lawmaking. In two cases originating in
Oregon, 31 and one in Ohio, 32 the Supreme Court considered whether
the federal guarantee clause 33 could prevent the direct exercise of
legislative power by the citizens of a state.

27. !d. at 71-72 (Table 4-2).
28. Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. PoL.
Sc1. REv. 124, 125 (1970).
29. See Comment, Popular Vote, supra note 23, at 181-82 & nn.42-47.
30. See Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Anarysis and Reassessment of a Western
Phenomenon, 28 WEsT PoL. 243, 243-48 (1975); supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
32. Ohio ex rei. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
33. Article IV,§ 4 of the Constitution, the guarantee clause, provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,
and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the Legislature,
or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
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In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the telephone
company, Pacific States, challenged the right of Oregon voters to
impose, by statewide initiative, a two percent tax on the gross
revenues of the firm. 34 Pacific States urged the Court to conclude
that legislation by plebiscite was not a "Republican Form of Government'' and therefore was unconstitutional. Representative
democracy, under this theory, was the equivalent of republican
government.
Speaking through Justice White, the Court refused to consider
this argument, finding the claim to be nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine. 35 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
thereafter would stand for the proposition that the federal judiciary
would not question the political organization of the states under the
guarantee clause. 36 Implicit in this holding and explicit in the Eastlake
decision, sixty-four years later, was acceptance of the plebiscite as
a valid exercise of legislative powerY

34. This annual license fee was imposed in 1906, just four years after Oregon had
amended its constitution to reserve initiative and referendum powers in its citizens. 223
U.S. 118, 133-34 (1912) (describing OR. CoNST. art. IV, § 1).
35. /d. at 151. The determination of what constituted a republican form of government involves "political and governmental [issues] and [is] embraced within the scope
of powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial power."
/d.
The Court referred to its earlier decision in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849), in reaching this position. Luther arose from a controversy known as the Dorr's
Rebellion of 1841, a brief and unsuccessful uprising in Rhode Island challenging the government established under the original colonial charter. !d. at 34-37. The case technically
was a trespass action brought by one Martin Luther against Luther Borden and others
after martial law had been declared. Luther, arrested in his house, asserted that the
established government had been displaced and that Borden had no authority to enter
his home. /d. at 34-35. The question before the Court was whether the federal judiciary
could determine which of the two competing Rhode Island governments was the lawful
authority at the time. /d. at 39-45.
Commentators have suggested that Luther v. Borden be applied narrowly ar1d not read
to mean that all claims under the guarantee clause are nonjusticiable. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 74 (1978); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV,
Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 534-35 (1962); Field,
The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485, 507 (1924).
36. Professor Bonfield has noted that:
Since 1912 ... the Supreme Court has consistently refused to entertain on the
merits any suit seeking to enforce the guarantee clause. On the basis of Pacific
Telephone, it has denominated all issues raised under the clause nonjusticiable. This
without any full consideration of the justification for its action, or possible distinctions between the case before it and Pacific Telephone and Telegraph.
Bonfield, supra note 35, at 556.
37. Given the inefficacy of the guarantee clause to invalidate local plebiscites, it has
been noted that "[i]nasmuch as the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall by
many States some decades back appears not to have imperiled their standing with Con-
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Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph was issued by the Court on the
same day as Kiernan v. Portland, another Oregon case. 38 In Kiernan,
the Portland city council received an ·initiative petition requesting
the construction of a bridge over the Willamette River; council subsequently submitted a charter amendment to the electorate. 39 After
voter endorsement but before any action was taken, Kiernan, a taxpayer, sued to enjoin the sale of the approved bonds designed to
finance construction, claiming that the use of the initiative violated
the guarantee clause. 40 The Court, again speaking through justice
White, refused to invalidate the use of the local initiative, referring
to ''the necessary operation and effect of the opinion in Pacific
States.' ' 41 The Court thus reaffirmed that it would not overturn state
and local legislative determinations based upon guarantee clause
challenges. 42
Finally, in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, the Supreme Court
rebuffed a guarantee clause attack upon the Ohio system of congressional redistricting that required citizen approval, by statewide
referendum, of the legislature's decision to redistrictY Davis claimed
that the referendum fell outside the state's legislative power and that
its use in redistricting measures violated article I, section 4 of the
federal Constitution. 44 Writing again for the Court, Justice White
first deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding that the
gress, it must be concluded that a considerable admixture of direct government does not
make a government 'unrepublican. ''' E. CoRWIN, THE CoNSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
ToDAY 266 (14th ed. 1978).
38. 223 U.S. 151 (1912).
39. !d. at 160 n.l.
40. !d. at 162-63.
41. !d. at 164.
42. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-29 (1962), once again discussed the justiciability
doctrine, referring to the Pacific States line of cases with approval. Drawing from the Luther
v. Borden precedent, Justice Brennan observed that one reason for the Court's reluctance
to employ the guarantee clause as part of its judicial power was that the provision "is
not a repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could utilize independently
in order to identify a state's lawful government." !d. at 223. By refusing to delve into
the meaning of the term ''republican form of government,'' the Court effectively limited
its power to rectify perceived imbalances of political power and organization at the state
and local level of government. Baker v. Carr also had the effect of declaring the guarantee
clause to be a standarclless allocation of judicial power, unenforceable because of its potential
breadth. Consequently, in this application, the nonjusticiability doctrine acts to restrain
the Court.
43. 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916). Under the Ohio Constitution, voters could call for a
referendum concerning any state law by obtaining the signatures of 6% of the voters on
·
a petition. !d.
44. !d. at 567. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 provides in part: "The Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . . "
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referendum was. part of the state's legislative power; 45 he then
reiterated the Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph nonjusticiability
theory and refused to disturb the Ohio redistricting scheme.
Although litigants persisted in raising the guarantee clause theory
for a time, 46 this constitutional doctrine clearly has lapsed into a
dormant state. It is important to note that, as a reflection of the
Supreme Court's attitude regarding the referendum and.initiative,
these cases reveal no antipathy towards the techniques themselves
nor any hint that their use would constitute a denial of due process.
The guarantee clause cases thus may be considered supportive of
the referendum and initiative movement.
2.

The Referendum and the Right to Vote

Once it is established that referenda and initiative decisionmaking
is authorized by state law and does not violate the guarantee clause
by creating a nonrepublican form of government, the focus then
shifts to the issue of who can vote. As a general proposition, the
Supreme Court has decreed that all citizens satisfying minimum
age, residency or citizenship requirements 47 are eligible to vote in
both general elections for candidates and special elections for
particular public issues. 48 Some states, however, have attempted to
limit the voting franchise in the latter class of elections. 49
45. 241 U.S. at 567-68.
46. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (attack on
state law regulating dairy industry); Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370,
374 (1930) (challenge to state tax that provided free school books); Ohio ex rei. Bryant
v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930) (challenge to delegated power
to create parks); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1917)
(challenge to state statute creating workmen's compensation program funded by mandatory contributions); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915) (review of Nebraska
statute granting power to state court to organize and to manage drainage district); Marshall
v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (challenge to injunction against vote on proposed
constitution following unconstitutional legislation).
47. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (States have power "to establish,
on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution ... qualifications
for the exercise of the franchise.'')
48. The Supreme Court has decided a series of cases examining the extent to which
the voting franchise may be limited constitutionally. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977);
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Hou111a, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (mem.); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
49. By way of background, the Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental constitutional importance of the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
The Constitution, while acknowledging the role of the states in setting voting qualifica-
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In Kramer v. Union Free School District, the Court considered a New
York statute that limited voting in school district elections to those
residents and their spouses who either owned or leased taxable property in the district, and to the parents or guardians of school
children. 50 New Y ark considered its franchise restrictions necessary
to restrict voting to those segments of the community that were
"primarily interested" in school matters. 51 Because Kramer was
denied his fundamental right to vote, the Supreme Court reviewed
the New York statute using the equal protection strict scrutiny
analysis. 52 The statutory voting limitation was invalidated because
it did not select "interested" voters "with sufficient precision to
justify denying appellant the franchise.'' 53 Notably, Kramer did not
. conclude that all franchise restrictions were unconstitutional; rather,
it forces state governments to meet a high standard of explanation
when, by design, voting is limited to those persons most interested
in or affected by a public decision.
Cipriano v. City of Houma, a companion case, presented the Court.
with a Louisiana statute that restricted the right to vote on the
issuance of revenue bonds to those who owned taxable property. 54
Cipriano brought a class action suit, on behalf of non-propertyowners, claiming that this statute violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 55 Louisiana asserted that property
owners had a special interest in the bond referendum because the
bonds were to finance municipally owned utilities, and because the
quality of the utility service would affect property values. 56 Analogizing to Kramer, the Court found the franchise restriction to be unconstitutional; there existed no compelling reason to limit voting
rights to a specially interested class of people. 57 Both property owners
tions and ordering the electoral process, contains specific limitations on those powers.
Because the Reynolds Court found the right to vote to be fundamental in nature, the
Court subsequently decided to subject state restrictions on that right to the "strict scrutiny"
level of equal protection review. /d.; see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 626 (1969) ("close and exacting examination"); see also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355
(1981 ); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
50. 395 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1969).
51. /d. at 631.
52. /d. at 626.
53. !d. at 632.
54. 395 U.S. 701, 703 (1969) (mem.).
55. /d. at 702-03. A three-judge panel at the district court level held the law constitutional. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. La. 1968), rev'd, 395
U.S. 701, 707 (1969). Cipriano brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1253. 395 U.S. at 704.
56. 395 U.S. at 704.
57. /d.
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and non-owners used the city's utilities and paid the rates; thus,
the Court reasoned that both had a common interest in the benefits
and burdens of the system. 58
its next judicial term the Supreme Court considered City of
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, in which property-owner voting restrictions,
as applied to the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds,
were challenged. 59 Arizona law provided that only real property taxpayers could vote in bond referenda. 60 The city attempted to
distinguish Cipriano on the ground that general obligation bonds were
involved and that real property taxes serviced those securities. 61
Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that the difference
in the interests of property owners and non-owners was not substantial enough to justify the franchise limitation. 62 All residents of
Phoenix would have an interest in the sewers, parks and public
buildings to be built with the bond proceeds. Moreover, Justice
White stated that "[p ]resumptively, when all citizens are affected

In

58. !d. The non-owners, as ratepayers, were interested in the issuance of debt because
the utility's bonds would be retired not by property taxes but rather by rates derived by
operation of the utilities. /d. at 705 & n.6. The Court found that the Louisiana law allowed
some interested voters to participate in the bond referendum but excluded other equally
affected citizens. /d. at 705-06. This selective distribution of the franchise, therefore, did
not meet the strict standards established in Kramer for constitutional limitation on voting.
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 625-30.
Unable to predict the result in Kramer, Louisiana apparently had argued that there
was a rational basis between its statute and a legitimate governmental interest. See Cipriano,
395 U.S. at 706. This showing was insufficient to satisfy the "exacting standard of precision" required by the Court. /d. at 706 (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632). However,
Justices Black and Stewart, in their concurrences, found the voting classification" 'wholly irrelevant to achievement' of the State's objective." /d. at 707 (Black and Stewart,
JJ., concurring). To these justices, the Louisiana scheme apparently would not have
satisfied even the rational basis test. See id.
In Cipriano, the Court reserved the question of whether ''in some circumstances, [the
state may] constitutionally limit the franchise to qualified voters who are also 'specially
interested' in the election.'' /d. at 704. Referring to the Kramer decision, the Court noted
that a law limiting voting rights would be tested for equal protection violations on the
basis of "whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected
than those the statute includes." /d. (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632). The Court finally
would uphold such a voting rights restriction in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
59. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). General obligation municipal bonds are secured by the general .
taxing authority of the issuer. Municipal issuers traditionally have raised revenues by way
of the local real property tax imposed upon the ownership of land and improvements.
Revenue bonds, on the other hand, are debt instruments secured entirely or partially by
the revenues generated by the improvement constructed with the bond proceeds. These
securities usually are not secured by the general taxing power of the issuer. See 15 E.
McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 43.34 (3d ed. 1970); 0. REYNOLDS,
supra note 16, § 104.
60. 399 U.S. at 206 & n.2.
61. /d. at 208.
62. /d. at 209.
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in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise. " 63
Despite City of Phoenix's strong statement, the Supreme Court soon
began to retreat from its sweeping policy requiring broad voter participation in local decisionmaking. 64 The Court first upheld a system
of limited franchise in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District. 65 California authorized the formation of water storage
districts that could plan and execute projects for the conservation
and distribution of water. 66 The directors of the water district were
chosen through general elections in which only landowners were
permitted to vote. In addition, voting rights were apportioned
according to the value of each voter's landY Asserting that they
had a substantial interest in the management of the water district,
voters excluded from water district elections challenged the constitutionality of the state statute,. claiming that it violated their rights
under the equal protection clause. 68
Speaking through Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to extend
the Kramer line of reasoning to the case at bar. 69 The general rule
favoring full electoral participation was rejected on the grounds that
the water district served a limited rather than general purpose, and
that its operations had a disproportionate impact upon residents who
owned land. 70 The Court emphasized that the water district system

63. !d.
64. The obligation to apply one person-one vote principles to state elections sprang
from the Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), extended the Reynolds rationale to the election of county
officials but reserved decision on its application to "a special-purpose unit of government
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than
other constituents." /d. at 483-84. The Kramer, Cipriano and City of Phoenix decisions all
reserved the question of whether the voting franchise could be limited constitutionally
to a restricted segment of the electorate. In these cases, the Court had not. ruled out the
possibility that in certain instances some citizens might have a special interest in public
or quasi-public matters that should give them complete control over important decisions.
65. 410
719 (1973).
66. /d. at 723-24.
67. /d. at 724-25.
68. /d. at 726. A three-judge panel at the district court level had upheld both the
franchise restriction and the provision for weighted voting. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S.
719, 735 (1973).
69. 410 U.S. at 728. Interestingly, the Court also rejected the heightened scrutiny
equal protection analysis of the California statute that had been used in the Kramer line
of cases. /d. at 730-31. At no point in the Salyer opinion did Justice Rehnquist explain
why the compelling state interest analysis had been abandoned.
70. /d. at 728.
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physically benefited land in the district and directly imposed financial burdens only upon landowners. 71
Salyer, then, represents an initial excursion from the general principles of one ·person-one vote recognized in Kramer. Although that
theory of uniform voting rights remains intact, 72 the Court subsequently has defined those circumstances when referendum voting
may be curtailed. 73
Hill v. Stone considered the Texas dual voting-box scheme for local
bond referenda. 74 Persons who had listed property for taxation voted
in one box; all other eligible voters placed their ballots in another.
A bond referendum passed only if it received both an overall majority
and a majority of the taxpayers, effectively giving property owners
veto power over the bond referenda in the state. 75
In a rather striking turnabout, the Court reestablished its support for broad-based voting rights and thus invalidated the Texas
practice. After reviewing its decisions in Kramer, Cipriano and City
of Phoenix, Justice Marshall wrote that the principle to be derived
from that line of cases was that ''any classification restricting the
franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the district or State can demonstrate that the

7l. !d. at 729. Once the limited franchise principle was accepted by the Court, the
next logical step-weighted voting-naturally followed. In his dissent, Justice Douglas
was concerned especially about the effects of allowing political representation based on
wealth or corporate land holdings. He found it foreign to the American tradition that
corporations should be admitted to the franchise. /d. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas perceived a danger from corporate domination of the individual, noting
that "[o]ne corporation can outvote 77 individuals in this district. Four corporations can
exercise these governmental powers as they choose, leaving every individual inhabitant
with a weak, ineffective voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed
of by those who wrote our Constitution." /d. at 742. It is difficult to imagine what would
have been Justice Douglas's reaction to the Court's decision in Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981). See infra note 79.
72. In a companion case to Salyer, the Supreme Court upheld a Wyoming statute permitting the formation and operation of a watershed improvement district by sole vote
of area landowners. Associated Enter. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S.
743 (1973) (per curiam) (weighted voting allowed).
73. Salyer has received generally unfavorable review from academic writers. See, e.g.,
J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA &J. YouNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 637 (2d ed.
1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 765.
74. 421
289, 292 (1975).
75. /d. The city of Fort Worth had employed this technique for city' transportation
improvements and library construction. /d. The library bond issue failed because it did
not receive the requisite majority vote from the property owners. /d. at 292-93. A lower
federal court decision invalidated this practice and enjoined its further application. Stone
v. Stovall, 377 F. Supp. 1016, 1024 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. Stone, 421
U.S. 289, 302 (.1975).
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classification serves a compelling state interest.' ' 76 The Court further developed the dichotomy between general and special interest
elections, placing municipal bond referenda in the former category
and therefore subject to a full community vote. 77 This opinion makes
it clear that property ownership cannot be the sole qualification for
participation in local government debt financing decisions. 78
In distinguishing the Kramer line of decisions from Salyer, a number
of points appear consistent. The Kramer cases all involved questions
concerning the provision of services enjoyed by the public as a
whole-for example, parks, transit, schools and libraries. These kinds
of benefits traditionally had been available to residents of urban and
suburban areas and did not pertain directly to the use of land within
the jurisdiction. In Salyer, the election involved a limited purpose
organization with narrow functions directly related to the economic
development of land in a primarily agricultural district. The
organization, although technically governmental in origin, appeared
to represent, in the Court's view, a voluntary association of landowners. This characterization of the communal action in support
of economic self-interest persuaded the Court to find an exception
to the Reynolds v. Sims principle lauding the right to vote. 79
76. !d. at 297. The Court readily embraced the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review as the test to be applied in franchise restrictions cases, notably absent from
the Court's holding in Salyer two years earlier. See id. Justice Marshall concluded that
"the state interests proffered by appellant and the city officials fall far short of meeting
the 'compelling state interest' test consistently applied in Kramer, Cipriano and Phoenix."
/d. at 301.
77. /d. at 298-301. Considering the Court's holding in Cipriano and City of Phoenix,
it is odd that the Court granted certiorari for the Hill case. The factual similarities are
striking, but perhaps the Court wished to reaffirm its earlier line of holdings after issuing
the Salyer decision. In fact, the Hill Court relegated its discussion of Salyer to a footnote
reference. See id. at 295 n.5.
78. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 ( 1966) (" [A] State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.").
79. See 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This idea was later confirmed in Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981). Justice Stewart noted that "though the state legislature has allowed water
districts to become nominal public entities in order to obtain less expensive bond financing,
the districts remain essentially business enterprises, created by and chiefly benefiting a
specific group of landowners." /d. at 368.
Following Hill v. Stone, the Supreme Court surprisingly approved franchise limitations
in two subsequent cases. The first case, Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action,
involved a provision of New York's constitution and municipal home rule law specifying
that a county charter or amendment would become effective only if a majority of city
voters and a separate majority of non-city voters gave their approval. 430 U.S. 259, 260-61
& nn.1 & 2 (1977). Consequently, this dual majority system gave both city and non-city
voters a veto power over county charter proposals. Town of Lockport-differs from the prior
decisions discussed in that it focuses not upon the right of citizens to vote, but rather
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Cases Examining Referendum Results

Often plebiscites have provided law on matters that legislative
bodies had declined to decide. As a result, issues of significant public
interest have been decided by the technique of direct legislation.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the first of a series offour cases
that tested the substantive results of initiatives and referenda against
the due process and equal protection requirements of the fourteenth

the effectiveness of votes once they are cast. The Supreme Court upheld the New York
dual majority system by noting the different interests of city and non-city voters in reordering
the structure of county government. /d. at 268-69. The Town of Lockport Court upheld
a referendum system that not only accepted the vote of all eligible voters within the jurisdiction but gave one segment of the community a controlling power of rejection. The nonmajoritarian control aspect of this holding may be of special significance to zoning referenda
litigation employing "ward veto" features. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. Town
of Lockport is consistent with the Salyer decision in at least one respect-that is, the preservation of political power in a portion of the total electorate. Yet this reservation of nonmajoritarian control in Town of Lockport appears considerably less open to abuse than the
situation in Salyer.
The most recent Supreme Court case in this area is Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981 ).
Under the challenged statutory scheme, only landowners could vote for directors of an
organization formed to store and deliver water to landowners in a particular district; voting
power was apportioned according to each landowner's acreage. !d. at 359. Non-landowners
living in the district challenged the constitutionality of the acreage-based franchise limitation by analogizing the functions of the water district to those of a general purpose government. It was asserted that electricity sales affected all residents, regardless of property
ownership. !d. at 360. The plaintiffs also alleged that, through its water management,
the district could significantly affect flood control and environmental conditions. /d.
Although the Court agreed that the Salt River district provided a more diverse range
of services than its counterpart in Salyer, it did not find this difference to have constitutional significance. !d. at 366. Writing for the five-justice majority in Ball, Justice Stewart
adopted a narrow view of the water district's functions, finding them limited enough to
avoid the "strict demands of Reynolds [v. Sims]." !d.
Of even greater significance is Justice Stewart's total rejection of a public impact analysis
as a means of determining whether voting restrictions will be upheld. See id. at 370. The
fact that the Salt River district supplied significant amounts of electrical power to nearly
half of the citizens of Arizona, issued tax exempt debt instruments, exercised eminent
domain and taxing powers and controlled water resources within a nearly quarter of a
million acre region did not convince the Court's majority that non-voting citizens were
being denied equal protection. The focus clearly was not on what the majority perceived
as incidental beneficiaries of the water district system but rather on ''the disproportionate
relationship the District's functions bear to the specific class of people whom the system
makes eligible to vote." /d. This latter group now can be identified in state legislation
and empowered to control a limited range of issues.
The Court's willingness to restrict the franchise in Salyer and Ball is attributable to
its narrow view regarding the community-wide impact of the special district decisions.
It is conceivable that future cases may find other special governmental decisions insulated
from general electoral control. However, so long as the methods of land use control remain a function of general purpose government, referendum decisions will remain open
to the full voting community.
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amendment. These cases were similar in one additional respect: they
considered housing and land use issues. A brief review of these opinions reveals the development of the Court's acceptance of plebiscite
decisionmaking at the state and local level of government.
Reitman v. Mulkey involved a federal equal protection challenge
to a California constitutional provision, adopted by initiative vote,
prohibiting the state, or its agencies, from restricting residential landowners from selling or leasing real property to the buyer of their
choice. 80 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether
such a voter-initiated constitutional amendment constituted illegal
state action in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. Justice
White concluded for the majority that considering the purpose of
the amendment-to forbid the state from interfering with the rights
of sellers and lessors to discriminate-the Supreme Court of California was correct in finding a federal constitutional defect. 81
Reitman's importance lies in its extension of fourteenth amendment theory to find invidious racial discrimination in less than direct
or affirmative state action. 82 Justice White considered constitutional
amendment by plebiscite equal to more conventional methods of
lawmaking. Moreover, the majority expanded the judicial role to
include not only a consideration of the explicit state activity but also
an assessment of the potential impact of the official action upon a
segment of the population. 83 Here, the effect of the California in-

80. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The initiative proposed adoption of the following amendment to the California constitution:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
/d. at 371. This initiative was overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 4,526,460 to 2,395, 747.
/d. at 388.
81. !d. at 373-81.
82. The majority in Reitman may have been concerned especially about the effect of
the amendment upon the ability of minority groups to seek relief from the state legislature
for real property discrimination matters. If § 26 had been upheld against fourteenth
amendment attack, political recourse against private discrimination would have been an
impossibility. This potential restriction upon available. political processes might have been
extremely influential. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
( 1938). Recently, the Court has reaffirmed the idea that the equal protection clause
"guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the community'' by preventing subtle distortions of governmental structure that impose ''special
burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation." Washington
v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982).
83. This precarious search for illicit voter intention has been. carried forward to the
present day. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 n.21 (1982).
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itiative would have been to prevent the state from devising and implementing fair housing regulations. 84 Reitman demonstrates the
Court's willingness to strike down a popularly generated social policy
position adversely affecting important interests of minority citizens.
It is not inconceivable that a similar attack might be aimed at
exclusionary zoning schemes adopted by referendum or initiative.
Although later Supreme Court opinions have made it more difficult
to assert successful constitutionally based discrimination claims, 85
under the proper factual setting Reitman could serve as a basis of
challenging exclusionary practices.
Two years after Reitman, the Supreme Court considered Hunter
v. Erickson, in which procedures to enforce a local fair housing
ordinance were challenged. 86 Hunter attempted to file a complaint
under certain antidiscrimination provisions relating to housing but
was informed that the city charter had been amended; any ordinance
regulating fair housing matters now required approval, by a majority
of voters at a referendum, before it could take effect. 87 The amendment also voided preexisting antidiscrimination legislation. 88 Because
the fair housing ordinance Hunter tried to enforce had not been
so approved, the city considered it ineffective by operation of the
charter amendment. 89
The majority rejected the city's assertion that the charter provision was merely ''a public decision to move slowly in a delicate area
of race relations.' ' 90 The Court viewed this ratification requirement
to be constitutionally impermissible because of its selective application to a limited subject matter-an ordinance opposing racial and
religious discrimination in housing-and of the probable negative
effect upon the ordinances being reviewed. 91 As in Reitman, the element of direct participatory democracy did not insulate the mandatory referendum practice from strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis and appropriate invalidation. Justice White noted that "[t]he
84. See 387 U.S. at 377.
85. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). These decisions reflect the
position that even when a neutral law has a disproportionate racial impact, a fourteenth
amendment violation is found only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.
86. 393 u.s. 385 (1969).
87. !d. at 387.
88. See id. The Court declined to hold that the repeal of anti-discrimination laws,
standing alone, violated the fourteenth amendment. !d. at 390 n.5; see also Crawford v.
Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539-40 (1982).
89. 393 U.S. at 388.
90. !d. at 392.
91. !d. at 390.
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sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.' ' 92
A third decision in the Reitman line of cases upheld a mandatory
referendum requirement applied to the development of governmentsponsored, low income housing projects. Injames v. Valtierra, California had adopted a constitutional provision demanding that a community referendum ratify any decision to proceed with a ''low-rent
housing project.' ' 93 Citizens in California localities rejecting subsidized housing proposals challenged the state constitutional provision in federal court.
The Court, in a brief opinion written by Justice Black, concluded
that the mandatory referendum technique did not violate the equal
protection clause. Justice Black distinguished Hunter from the facts
at hand by noting that the California constitution did not create
separate classifications based upon race, 94 but only upon wealth.
This difference was of critical importance to the logic of the
decision. 95 Avoiding any form of disproportionate impact analysis,
Justice Black found the constitutional provision to be a race-neutral
device supported by reasonable public purposes. 96 Because the
California system applied the referendum technique only to low income housing developments, the wealth-related classifications did
not necessitate judicial review under the strict scrutiny level of equal
protection analysis.
james v. Valtierra is the first modern case in which the Court
accorded state referendum and initiative schemes broad respect as
illustrations of direct democracy. Injustice Black's view, "[p]rovisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to

92. Irj. at 392.
93. 402 U.S. 137, 139 n.2 (1971). The California constitution had been amended
because the state supreme court had barred local referenda on low income housing proposals, believing that they constituted non-legislative acts and thus were outside of the
scope of the referendum power. See Housing Auth. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550,
557-58, 219 P.2d 457, 460-61 (1950).
94. 402 U.S. at 141.
95. The mandatory referral ordinance in Hunter v. Erickson was similar structurally
to the constitutionally based system found in James v. Valtierra, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
In Hunter, however, the referendum requirement applied to fair housing ordinances with
the explicit goal of dealing with racial discrimination. This element triggered the application of the equal protection strict scrutiny analysis. In Valtierra, the state constitutional
provision in question nominally affected only low income persons. The Valtierra Court
refused to extend the Hunter analysis and result to the facts before it. See 402 U.S. at 141.
96. Justice Black emphasized that the referendum procedure provided the general
citizenry a method to have "a voice" in local fiscal and land development matters. 402
U.S. at 143. Without directly stating it, Justice Black assumed that these were reasonable
objectives for government to have; they were, therefore, constitutionally acceptable.
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bias, discrimination, or prejudice.' ' 97 This idea that local plebiscites
represent a form of majoritarian decisionmaking, deserving of judicial
approval, had its inception in Valtierra and was carried forward in
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises. 98 By eliminating the racial
issue from the context of the decision, the Valtierra Court gave strong
support to the mandatory referendum as a structure for local government law and policymaking.

C.
1.

The Eastlake Case

State Court Consideration

In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, the Supreme Court of
the United States first considered a constitutional challenge to the
practice of subjecting local rezoning decisions to a mandatory referendum approval. 99 The Court held that a local charter provision of
this type did not violate federal constitutional due process
guarantees. 100
The facts of the case were uncomplicated. Forest City Enterprises,
a real estate developer, sought to rezone an eight-acre parcel of land,
previously classified for limited industrial use, to build a high-rise,
multifamily apartment building. 101 Following existing procedures,
the Eastlake, Ohio Planning Commission recommended approval
of the land use modification to the city counciP 02 Prior to council's
action, however, the citizens of Eastlake amended the city charter
to require that any land use change adopted by council would not
become effective until it was ratified by fifty-five percent of the voters
in a referendum. 103 Council then approved the requested rezoning
proposal; but when the developer applied for the necessary parking
and yard permit, the planning commission denied its request because
the Eastlake voters had not ratified council's rezoning decision. 104
While Forest City's suit for declaratory judgment was pending, the
Eastlake voters considered and disapproved the rezoning request. 105
Dissatisfied by the referendum result, Forest City would not be
comforted by the holding of the trial court. In a brief opinion, the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

!d. at 141.
See 426 U.S. 668, 672-74 (1976).
426 u.s. 668 (1976).
!d. at 679.
!d. at 670.
!d.
!d. at 670 n.l.
!d. at 670-71.
!d. at 671.
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Ohio Court of Common Pleas upheld the charter and found no improper retroactive application of the Eastlake referendum requirement to Forest City . 106 The trial court cloaked the Eastlake charter
provision with a presumption of validity, and that presumption was
not overcome by the evidence presented by Forest City . 107 In
retrospect, the decision did not discuss seriously any of the legal
challenges raised to the Eastlake charter, but it did conclude with
a simple statement that masked the complexity of the issues presented
by the case. Judge Clair wrote that "[t]he Court makes no comment on the wisdom of what appears to be a cumbersome method
of changing zoning to meet changing times. " 108
Forest City appealed the trial court's decision, and the issue before
the appellate court bore no similarity to those argued below. The
appellant maintained that the Eastlake charter provision requiring
mandatory zoning referenda was unconstitutional because it omitted
certain procedural requisites demanded both by the state constitution and statutes. 109 For the appellate court, Judge Cook ruled that
this technical challenge failed because state law anticipated expansion
of referendum and initiative rights through the adoption of particular
charter provisions. Therefore, the Eastlake charter did not conflict
with article II, section 1f of the Ohio constitution and was a valid
exercise of referendum power. 110 Without any mention of the varied
106. The trial court's ruling indicated that there had been no improper delegation of
city council's legislative functions and no denial of due process for failure to provide the
voters with meaningful decisionmaking standards. Both the trial and appellate court opinions were not reported formally but were obtained from the appendices of the petitioner's
brief before the Supreme Court of the United States. See Petition for and Writ of Certiorari at 45-47 (Appendix C) (Court of Common Pleas) & Brief for Appellant at 39-44
(Appendix B) (Court of Appeals), City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
It is difficult to know precisely which arguments were made at the trial court level
because Judge Clair's opinion does not establish clearly the claims made. Occasionally,
partially described assertions were dismissed without discussion, thereby escaping analysis.
107. This traditional presumption of validity of municipal ordinances allocates the burden
of proof to the challenger in a suit to invalidate the local legislation. See 4 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 2, § 25.26; P. RoHAN, ZoNING AND LAND UsE CoNTROLS § 52.09[2] (1979).
108. Petition, supra note 106, at 47. Perhaps judge Clair viewed the Eastlake charter
provision as merely a procedural obstacle engrafted on to the traditional rezoning method.
109. !d. at 40-43. Precisely, the issue was whether the mandatory referendum device
attached to zoning actions violated an Ohio statute requiring that referenda be preceded
by a signed petition of 10% of the voters at the prior gubernatorial election. The court
of appeals concluded that a charter municipality need not comply with that procedure
if its charter creates a different method for conducting a referendum. !d. at 42-43; see
State ex ret. Bramblette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 265 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1970)
(municipality may narrow scope of constitutional gra,nt of referendum authority by
specifying types of measures to which a referendum may be directed).
110. Petition, supra note 106, at 41-42. See infra note 114 for the pertinent text of the
state constitution.
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legal arguments raised below, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court, and the case proceeded to the state supreme court.
By the time Forest City's appeal reached the Supreme Court of
Ohio, it was clear that the constitutionality of the Eastlake charter
provision under federal law would be the primary issue for consideration. In a five-two decision, the state supreme court reversed
the lower court rulings, holding instead that the mandatory referendum device denied Forest City property rights without due process
of law, a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 111 This holding
stood briefly as a victory for landowners against the practice of
automatic referral of all proposed land use changes to the
community's voters for approval. It also represented a significant
reversal oflongstanding state law favoring the broad use of plebiscites
to establish and to redirect local governmental policies. 112
The court commenced its consideration of Forest City's appeal
in much the same way as the Supreme Court of the United States
would a year later; it began by classifying rezoning as a legislative
act and therefore subject to the referendum process. 113 Such a step
was necessary because the Ohio constitution explicitly limited
municipal referendum power to legislative matters. 114 Justice Brown,
writing for the majority, properly employed the traditional method
in classifying the eight-acre rezoning proposal in Eastlake. No attempt
was made to examine the judicially imposed label of ''legislative
act" attached to the rezoning. 115 Under the terms of the Eastlake
111. Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 198,324 N.E.2d 740,
747-48 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
112. In general, the Ohio courts have interpreted the referendum and initiative provision of the state constitution to favor the exercise of the referendum right and the objectives sought under it. See, e.g., State ex rel. Middletown v. City Comm., 140 Ohio St.
368, 44 N.E.2d 459 (1942), cited in Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. South Euclid, 110 Ohio App.
535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960) and Merryman v. Gorman, 117 N.E.2d 629 (Ct. Common
Pleas 1953).
113. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189-90, 324 N.E.2d at 743; see City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1976).
114. Article II, section 1f of the Ohio Constitution provides:' "The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which
such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative
action; such powers shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law."
9HIO CoNsT. art. II, § 1f (emphasis added).
115. Justice Stevens, in his dissent to the Supreme Court ruling in Eastlake, cited decisions of the supreme courts of Oregon and Washington that had looked behind the
legislative/administrative labels and concluded that the traditional classifications and subsequent implications regarding judicial review need not be followed; the essence of particular rezonings was adjudication to which procedural due process rights should apply.
426 U.S. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 Or. 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash.
2d 292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972)).
\
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charter, ''any change in the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance" affecting land use were to be reviewed
first by the planning commission and later approved by the city council, followed by a fifty-five percent favorable vote of the electorate. 116
The effect of the charter was to subject all land use changes to the
mandatory referendum and not just those characterized as legislative
acts. 117 This overinclusiveness in applying the referendum requirement to administrative actions not only violated the express provisions of the Ohio constitution but also reflected the intent of the
Eastlake voters to control directly all deviations from the preexisting
zoning structure. Relying upon a past decision, the state supreme
court struck down this attempted extension of mandatory referenda to administrative acts. 118
The court then embarked upon its most significant task-that
is, determining whether the Eastlake mandatory referendum system
denied the landowner rights protected by the due process clause of
the federal Constitution. 119 The court's due process inquiry was not

116. The charter provision is reprinted at 426 U.S. at 686 n.B (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 7. The language of the Eastlake charter was so expansive that it could have required
all land use changes to be first considered by the planning commission and then subject
to a vote by council. Depending upon the meaning given to the term "change to the
existing land use," variances, special use permits, rezonings and other changes conceivably
could have been subject to the elaborate approval procedure established in the charter.
Undoubtedly, this would have discouraged any land development requiring even a slight
variation from the existing zoning rules. A survey of Ohio municipalities revealed other
overinclusive charter and ordinance provisions, similar to those litigated in Eastlake, in
existence long after that decision. See infra note 210.
118. See Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971). In Myers,
the court held that a city council's granting of a permit for the operation of a sanitary
landfill-pursuant to a local zoning' ordinance-constituted an administrative act not subject
to voluntary referendum proceeding. In this case, as in the Eastlake charter provision,
the city council-normally a legislative body-was acting in an administrative capacity
by executing or administering a law already in existence. In Myers, the connection of the
council-issued permit to the zoning code was determinative. 27 Ohio St. 2d at 14, 271
N.E.2d at 866. In Eastlake, the expansion of the referendum requirement to acts traditionally characterized as administrative facilitated the same result.
119. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191-96, 324 N.E.2d at 744-46. With the hindsight of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Eastlake, it now appears that Justice Brown would have been
wise to articulate a state constitutional law theory of due process underlying his decision
to strike down the Eastlake procedure. Had the state supreme court made the same
arguments in defense of landowners' rights under the rubric of state constitutional law,
the Supreme Court probably would not have had grounds to reverse. There is, of course,
no reason why principles of state constitutional law may not be more protective of individual rights than their federal counterparts. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369
n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974). Indeed, Justice Brennan has suggested that state constitutional provisions need not mirror federal law and, further, that state law ought to
retain it~ own vitality as a separate source of protective constitutional principle. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 498-502
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focused upon the substantive result of the Eastlake practice; rather,
the Ohio opinion examined the more intriguing question of whether
the city's procedure denied Forest City Enterprises the right to a
decision made by a "responsible organ of municipal government. " 120
Although Justice Brown attempted to define a due process standard
for the method of land use decisionmaking, in the end, he simply
summarily concluded that Eastlake's mandatory referendum system
''clearly violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'' 121
Instead of focusing upon violations of specific procedural due process rights, the court grounded its opinion on an improper delegation theory modelled after the Supreme Court's decision in
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge. 122 Justice Brown
reasoned that to subject local government legislative acts to referendum approval constituted an unlawful delegation of a city's legislative
authority. Given that Eastlake derived its municipal power from
the people and that the Ohio constitution expressly reserved the right
of plebiscite to Ohio citizens, 123 the court's delegation analysis was
particular! y un persuasive.
Linking a constitutional due process violation with the Roberge
theory of unlawful delegation confused the issue. Plainly applica(1977). As an admonition to both the state judiciary and to attorneys, Justice Brennan
adds this further comment:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual •
liberties, their protections often extending beyorid those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation offederallaw. The legal revolution which has brought federal
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force
of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
!d. at 491. The Ohio supreme court lost an opportunity to establish such an independent
course in the Eastlake case. Interestingly, in California, voters have adopted a constitutional provision specifying that "(r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 24.
120. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
121. /d. The Ohio court apparently never measured the Eastlake procedure against
anything other than a federal due process standard. In a rather superficial fashion, Justice
Brown concluded that Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.
116 (1926), was most similar factually to the matter at bar and therefore controlling. 41
Ohio St. 2d at 195-96, 324 N.E.2d at 746. The court's effort to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1970), also was unsatisfactory. See
41 Ohio St. 2d at 196-98, 324 N.E.2d at 747. The state supreme court believed that the
Valtierra referendum was acceptable because it raised an issue of ''community-wide policymaking"-that is, the approval of low income public housing. !d. at 197, 324 N.E.2d
at 747. But the court never explained adequately why·a community vote on matters of
narrower application should be constitutionally impermissible.
122. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 194-96, 324 N.E.2d at 746; see Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
123. See OHio CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
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tion of Roberge was inapposite. The Supreme Court of Ohio
misconstrued the Roberge rationale underlying the fourteenth amendment due process violation. Under the Roberge facts, the Supreme
Court was concerned with the delegation of complete land use control power to an extremely narrow segment of the communitythose property owners living within four hundred feet of a proposed
philanthropic home. 124 The Eastlake case, however, presented a
localized decision subject ~o confirmation by the entire community.
The Roberge Court bristled at the exclusionary effect the ordinance
before it would have: it not only would permit a small number of
citizens to prevent construction of a socially beneficial structure,
but it also would have precluded any judicial intervention. 125 The

124. 278 U.S. at 118. Justice Butler, speaking for the Roberge majority, clearly was
offended by what he perceived as the exclusion of a socially important activity by a small
group of determined neighbors. He noted that:
The section [of the Seattle ordinance] purports to give the owners of less than
one-half of the land within 400 feet of the proposed building authority-uncontrolled
by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative action-to prevent the trustee
from using its land for the proposed home. The superintendent is bound by the
decision or inaction of such owners. There is no provision for review under the
ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound by any official
duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may
subject the trustee to their will or caprice.
!d. at 121-22. The idea that a few individuals could exercise prohibitory powers as part
of a public law regulatory scheme particularly concerned the Roberge Court. Such an unconstrained private use of police power was found to be "repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' /d. at 122. In Eastlake, Justice Brown never considered whether an exclusionary land use decision arrived at by a referendum vote of
the entire community also would be "repugnant" to his conception of landowners' due
process rights.
125. Undoubtedly, this feature of the case made the Seattle consent provision even
more obnoxious to the Court. The landowner, a charitable organization, planned to replace
an existing home for the elderly poor with a new building accommodating thirty residents;
the proposed structure would be situated 110 to 400 feet from bordering land. !d. at 117.
The zoning ordinance was amended in 1925 to contain an enhanced consent requirement,
applying only to a "philanthropic home for children or old people," that demanded the
approval of two-thirds of the neighbors within 400 feet of the site. !d. at 120 n. •. The
original zoning ordinance allowed approval of such diverse uses as fraternity, sorority
or boarding houses for students, private schools, community club houses and "a building
necessary for the proper operation of a public utility'' to be within the discretion of the
Board of Public Works after a public hearing. !d. Clearly, these land uses appear as disruptive to the character of a neighborhood as a philanthropic home, yet they need only obtain the approval of a municipal administrative agency. It was this apparent bias against
the petitioner's proposed home that may have piqued the Court. It seems that the socially
favored character of the home also allowed the Court to distinguish its decision from that
in Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), in which a neighbor's consent
provision was upheld as applied to the location of billboards. The home in Roberge did
not parallel the urban billboard, considered to be "by reason of [its] nature ... offensive." 278 U.S. at 122.
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Eastlake circumstances parallel those in Roberge in terms of exclusionary effect but not method. 126
Justice Brown perceived that a system of mandatory referenda
for all land use changes was an unwarranted extension of the familiar
plebiscite under federal constitutional doctrine. He accepted the use
of the referendum device for large scale, community-wide decisions
but rejected it for more specific determinations affecting separate
parcels of land. 127 Because the opinion did not frame this position
in terms of particular elements of unfairness experienced by individual landowners, the court's federal due process holding was
nothing but an unsupported conclusion. In retrospect, a fully
developed rationale might have been considerably more _persuasive
to the Supreme Court upon review.
The state supreme court's holding can be best interpreted as a
judicial reaction to the danger of arbitrary action by a majority of
voting citizens in a community. The state court's opinion expressed
the idea that traditional, local government legislative policy choice
was superior to similar action taken by citizen referendum on an
ad hoc basis. Unfortunately, the court never explained fully why
zoning plebiscite votes were inherently more suspect than similar
decisions made by the customary, representative method. The
essence of the court's view was that an individual landowner would
be subjected to an extraordinary approval requirement over which
neither the owner nor the courts could exercise much control. This
factor, as much as the additional uncertainty imposed upon landowners seeking zoning changes, explains the court's hostility to the
referendum zoning device as an abstract proposition.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Eastlake revealed another, more sinister ground for rejecting the referendum
zoning technique, its potential for exclusionary zoning. In his concurrence, Justice Stern viewed referendum zoning as a mtinicipal
practice adopted for the sole purpose of obstructing attempts to pro-

126. Justice Stem, in his concurring opinion in Eastlake, characterized referendum zoning
as an undesirable technique purposefully adopted "to obstruct change in land use" and
more specifically intended "to prevent multi-family housing." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199,
324 N.E.2d at 748 (Stern,]., concurring). In terms of judicial review, the Ohio courts
could have considered only legal challenges to the adequacy of the referendum procedure
under state law and the reasonableness of the zoning classification.
127. In his dissent to the Supreme Court's Eastlake opinion,-Justice Stevens adopted
the same position. He noted that, "I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative
or the referendum as an appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy.
I think it is equally clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating
the rights of individual litigants." 426 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vide multifamily housing within the locality. 128 Instead of embracing james v. Valtierra's positive characterization of land use referenda,
Justice Stern interpreted the Eastlake charter provision to foster
economic and racial exclusion from suburban communities. 129 Implicit in his theory is the understanding that the mandatory
referendum requirement could be used by existing community
residents to preserve high cost, low density housing within the
municipality. Proposals for less costly residential development to
be occupied by persons of other racial or economic groups could
be rebuffed by the voters wishing to protect their homogeneous community. Justice Stern's opinion demonstrated a fear that zoning practices could become more discriminatory and, ironically, more legally
defensible if the referendum device were given judicial sanction. 130
In an effort to forestall that result, the Ohio court pronounced the
municipal technique of referendum zoning to be unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment.
128. Justice Stern explicitly concluded that "[z]oning provisions such as that in Eastlake's
charter have a simple motive, and that is to exclude, to build walls against the ills, poverty,
racial strife, and the people themselves, of our urban areas." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 324
N.E.2d at 749 (Stern, J., concurring).
129. /d. at 199-201, 324 N.E.2d at 748-49 (Stern, J., concurring). An amicus brief
filed by Lawyers for Housing had argued that such a provision was designed with an
exclusionary intent. /d. at 198 n.4, 324 N.E.2d at 747 n.4.
130. Justice Stern's fears became reality five years later in another Ohio case. See United
States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F. 2d 562
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). In City of Parma, the municipality was
sued by the United States for violating §§ 804(a) and 817 of the Fair Housing Act (42
U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & 3617 (1976)). !d. at 1055. The Justice Department successfully
demonstrated that Parma voters had adopted a community policy of racial and economic
exclusion by enacting a city ordinance that required prior referendum approval of""(1)
the development, construction or acquisition in any manner of a subsidized housing project by a public body, or (2) any participation by private individuals or non-public bodies
in any program in which the Federal Government pays all or part of the rent of lowincome families." /d. at 1086 (citing Parma, Ohio, General Bldg. Regs. § 1528 (Nov.
2, 1971)). This initiative ordinance bore a striking similarity to the California constitutional provision upheld by the Supreme Court six-and-one-half months earlier in James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 139 n.2 (1971) (quoting CAL. CoNsT. art. XXXIV, § 1).
The Parma electorate later passed another initiative ordinance requiring "voter approval
for any change in the zoning code or in existing land uses." 494 F. Supp. at 1089 (citing
Parma, Ohio, Bldg. Code§ 1229.01 (Nov. 5, 1974)). In an extensive opinion, Chief Judge
Battisti held that these two ordinances formed part of a pattern and practice of racial
discrimination that violated the Fair Housing Act. /d. at 1096. In his subsequent remedial
order, Judge Battisti totally invalidated the 1971 ordinance and modified the 1974 legislation by precluding its application to "any proposed change in land use where any low
or moderate income housing project is proposed." United States v. City of Parma, 504
F. Supp. 913, 920 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 926 (1982). Thus, City of Parma illustrates that an otherwise constitutionally
acceptable referendum zoning ordinance may be thwarted if found to serve racially exclusionary purposes violative of federal antidiscrimination statutes.
·
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Supreme Court Consideration

By a six-three vote, the Supreme Court of the .United States reversed the state court's holding and upheld the referendum zoning
technique against federal constitutional challenge. 131 In reaching this
result, the majority embraced a theoretically coherent, yet surprisingly short-sighted view of the impact of the referendum zoning
device upon landowners and upon the public land use control system.
The decision clearly rejected the reasoning of the Ohio supreme
court'. 132
The Court approached the issue of referendum zoning as a question of classification: was the referendum device a reservation or
a delegation of legislative power? Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, found that the Ohio court had mischaracterized the
referendum as a delegation oflawmaking authority without any standards or guidelines within which to confine the nearly unbridled
discretion of the voters. 133 He noted that " [a] referendum cannot
... be characterized as a delegation of power ... [because] all power
derives from the people .... [T]he people can reserve to themselves
power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned
to the legislature." 134 As a matter of technical analysis this conclusion was correct; in the state constitution, Ohioans had reserved
to themselves the power to legislate directly by way of the referendum and initiative. 135 However, by focusing upon the Eastlake
referendum provision as an example of reserved legislative power,
Chief Justice Burger preordained the result in this case by way of
a simple syllogism: if the referendum is but a method of direct legislation generally reserved to the people and if rezoning matters are
categorized as local legislative acts, then rezoning by referendum
is exempt from procedural due process attacks in much the same
way as are other legislative decisions. 136 With this starting point,
131. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 669, 679-80 (1976).
132. /d. at 679.
133. /d. at 672.
134. /d. The Court stressed the referendum's role in and implied its desirability as
part of the democratic process. See id. at 673,678-79 (citing Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141, 143).
135. The Ohio constitution provides in part: "The initiative and referendum powers
are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such
municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action;
such powers shall bt; exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.'' OHIO
CaNST. art. II, § lf.
136. See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915) (general legislation valid even if every affected individual is not accorded due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908) (same). Even in Londoner, however, the Court acknowledged that a state tax
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the Court effectively insulated the referendum zoning procedure from
constitutional challenges based upon the unfairness of the decisionmaking process.
Once cloaked with the "legislative act" characterization, the
referendum zoning technique easily could withstand attack as an
improper or standardless delegation oflegislative power. Under this
rationale, the Eastlake voters were exercising direct control over matters within the broad area of zoning legislation. Consequently, any
analogy to the improper delegation of power to administrative agencies was irrelevant. 137 While this conclusion followed logically from
the legislative classification, it ignored the basic principle addressed
by the Supreme Court of Ohio-that fundamental local policy choices
be made ''by a responsible organ of government'' in a non-arbitrary
fashion. 138 Unlike its Ohio counterpart, the Supreme Court was not
disturbed about the lack of fair procedure inherent in referendum
zoning. By declining to impose due process limits on the practice
of rezoning by public vote, the Court was willing to limit the federal
interest to questions surrounding the substantive effect of the zoning decision. 139 With the legislative classification neatly made, the
scope of federal constitutional review would be limited to matters
of irrational application 140 or confiscatory effect. 141
In the name of participatory democracy, Chief justice Burger permitted localities to rezone land by way of procedures not specificalstatute, administered by a local board of equalization, works an unconstitutional denial
of due process when it taxes local property without opportunity for redress. /d. at 385·86.
And in Bi-Metallic, imposition of a particularly onerous burden upon a limited number
of landowners militated in favor of finding a federal violation. See 239 U.S. at 446.· Might
not such an analogy have been important to the Eastlake court?
137. See 426 U.S. at 675.
138. See Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196,324 N.E.2d
740, 746 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
139. See 426 U.S. at 676. Chief Justice Burger was not convinced that the local legislative
body would follow predetermined standards for decision any more than the voting citizenry.
/d. at 675 n.10. Because of his lack of confidence in the representative decisional process,
the Chief Justice apparently surmised that referendum actions were at least as worthy
of support as legislative actions. He concluded that "the critical constitutional inquiry,
rather, is whether the zoning restriction produces arbitrary or capricious results." /d. at
676 n.10. In this instance Chief Justice Burger appeared to blur his understanding of
legislative motivation with a reasonably specific statement describing the elements required
for procedural fairness.
140. See id. at 676-77 (distinguishing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926)); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (zoning decision
violates fourteenth amendment when not related to public health and welfare). See generally
8 E. McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 25.43 (3d ed. 1983). This
position avoids the essential question presented by the Eastlake case-whether there is a
fundamental constitutional right to a fair procedure in a rezoning case.
141. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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ly authorized by state land use law. By granting the electorate the
ultimate power to grant or deny rezoning actions, the Court nearly
obliterated the landowners' preexisting rights to the traditional rezoning process. 142 Eastlake's system measures, in a rough way, general
community support for a change in land use regulations. Yet the
holding in Eastlake permitted the use of the referendum zoning system
for all rezoning determinations, whether or not of community-wide
interest. Chief Justice Burger uniformly applied the legislative
characterization to both of these factual situations; he failed to explain adequately why the justifiable rules regarding community-wide
legislation ought to apply with equal force to rezoning requests of
a limited geographical, social or economic impact. 143
As a practical matter, perhaps the Court declined to distinguish
between these two categories of rezonings in an effort to conserve
judicial resources. But this motivation would not justify the position taken. The application of the referendum requirement to "spot"
rezonings 144 denies the landowner the right to a fair procedure in
which there is a "decisionmaker [who is] impartial and qualified
to understand and to apply the controlling rules.'' 145 In these cases,
the adverse impact of the referendum rezoning technique is focused particularly upon the individuals seeking the zoning change and
is imposed with little recourse for judicial review. Further, the
Court's holding in Eastlake operates to insulate only those zoning
actions classified as legislative from the demands of procedural due
process analysis. By comparison, other forms of relief from _land
use regulations, such as variances, special exceptions and special
use permits, would have been considered administrative or adjudicative acts, and therefore subject to minimal elements of procedural rights. 146 It is difficult to justify the Court's unsupported
distinction.
The Eastlake referendum approval system also affected the local
community planning methodology. Under the charter, the referral
mechanism was constructed so that essentially changes only to the
142. See 426 U.S. at 682-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally 8 E. McQUILLIN,
supra note 140, § 25.65.
143. Chief justice Burger apparently believed, as did justice Stevens, that such a decision should be left to the state courts. See 426 U.S. at 683-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. For a discussion of "spot" zoning, see D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAw§ 6.23
( 1982).
145. 426 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. The Supreme Court of California's ruling in Topanga Ass'njor a Scenic Community
v. County of Los Angeles exemplifies the high level of administrative factfinding and procedure needed to justify the issuance of a zoning variance. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836,522 P.2d 12 (1974) (en bane).
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existing zoning scheme had to be ratified by the voters. 147 In practical terms, this extraordinary approval mechanism froze the present land use control system. The Court did not view municipal
planning and zoning as a gradually evolving process requiring
periodic legislative reexamination and change. The present zoning
configuration in a jurisdiction with a referendum zoning requirement effectively is preserved by the fact that a rezoning ordinance
cannot be successful unless it survives both city council and voter
approval. In creating such a two-tiered system, the ultimate responsibility attached to rezoning decisions has been diffused and decentralized. Indirectly this reduces the influence of professional city planners in the municipal land use regulatory system because all zoning
changes would require voter ratification. A city planning director's
recommendation, even if fully accepted by the city council, might
not be approved by the electorate.
Elimination of the representative feature of local government
legislative decisionmaking, rather than constituting an admirable
return to participatory democracy, changes the essence of land use
determinations. Ironically, the Supreme Court's broad approval of
the referendum zoning technique silences the articulate presentation of views on matters of public interest and removes the need
for a decisionmaking body to defend coherently the positions taken.

III.

ZONING REFERENDA AND INITIATIVES
IN THE STATE CouRTS

Eastlake represents the sole instance in which the Supreme Court
o( the United States considered the constitutionality of municipal
systems combining zoning and referendum approval; as noted above,
subjecting land use decisions to the direct control of the electorate
was found not to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The court's narrow holding presented a simplified view
of the referendum zoning techniques and a limited application of
constitutional due process principles. It hardly reflects the variety
of issues and analyses found in state court opinions considering
referendum and initiative land use decisionmaking. This section of
the Article examines the analytical approaches taken by the state
courts in this type of litigation with special emphasis given to those
decisions rendered since Eastlake. Through this analysis, it will
become clear that the Eastlake holding has not served as a great im147. 426 U.S. at 670 n.1 (quoting
1971)).

EASTLAKE,

OHio,

CHARTER

art. VIII, § 3 (Nov. 2,
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petus for the adoption of referendum zoning; in fact, state law has
been substantially more influential.
Referendum zoning matters have been a frequently litigated local
government law subject in many states. Although the Supreme Court
first considered referendum zoning in 1976, state courts have decided
cases involving this phenomenon since the inception of zoning as
a municipal regulatory technique. 148 State courts often are presented
with a choice of competing public values: a fundamental respect
for direct popular decisionmaking through electoral devices versus
the desire to preserve the existing, judicially enforceable planning
and zoning regulatory system. Despite Eastlake's sweeping encouragement of land use control by direct voter participation, the courts
in several states have limited the scope of referendum zoning and
preserved the existing system of planning. State court judges
apparently have realized that upholding a system of land use decisionmaking by plebiscite greatly limits judicial supervision of the conventional process by which significant community development questions are answered and private wealth transfers are made. State
judges wisely note that with a referendum zoning approval
mechanism superimposed on the traditional zoning procedure, novel
problems arise concerning the timing of judicial review, procedural
compliance with statutory referendum requirements, and the power
to order the remedy of rezoning.
For the most part, state courts have employed two major legal
theories in approaching these cases. The first category places primary
focus upon the precise nature of the local government's land use
decision. The court determines whether, as a matter of state law,
the particular type of zoning action was eligible for decision by direct
popular vote; eligibility typically exists if the local land use decision
can be classified a "legislative" one. 149 For a number of reasons,

148. See, e.g., Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929), overruled,
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473,
480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976); see also Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253
P. 932 (1927).
149. See, e.g., Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P .2d 601, 602 (1980);
Arne! Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 516, 620 P.2d 565, 569, 169
Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (1980) (en bane); Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 303-04
(Colo. 1981) (en bane); O'Meara v. City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 583, 356 A.2d
906, 908-09 (1975); Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174
(Fla. 1983); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); Chynoweth v. City of Hancock, 107 Mich. App. 360, 362, 309 N.W.2d
606, 607 (1981); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 29, 202 N.W.2d 892, 896
(1972); Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of S. Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 537-39, 164 N.E.2d
180, 182-83, appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166 N.E.2d 924 (1960).
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only legislative matters may be exposed to plebiscite control. 15 ° Consequently, actions that are characterized as "administrative" or
"quasi-judicial" cannot be made properly subject to referendum
approval. 151 If a non-legislative matter has undergone the referendum process, its result must be invalidated. Once classified as a
legislative act, a local government decision acquires immunity from
most procedural due process attacks. 152
A second group of decisions examines the relationship between
the statutory procedures for zoning activities and those permitted
when land use decisions are made by referendum or initiative; courts
consider what, if any, conflict exists between the specific procedural
requisites of state zoning legislation and the general requirements
of direct electoral decisionmaking. 153 In these decisions, the elements
of a referendum and initiative procedure have been subordinated
to the particular notice and hearing requirements of the state's zoning
enabling statute. Although courts have used several rationales in
reaching this result, the effect has been to nullify decisions generated
by the referendum method for failure to give the affected landowner
sufficient pre-enactment rights to notice and public hearing. 154 Other
150. Often this is true because of the dictates of state constitutional provisions or statutes.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text. The legislative/administrative distinction,
although long recognized, has been difficult to apply. See Fordham & Prendergast, The
Initiative and Referendum at the Municipal Level in Ohio, 20 U. CIN. L. REv. 313, 320 (1951);
see also 5 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 16.55 (3d ed. 1981).
As a practical matter, subjecting zoning administrative decisions to popular approval could
interfere unduly with necessary and routine workings of local government. See Kelley v.
John, 162 Neb. 319, 323-24, 75 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1956), overruled, 210 Neb. 504, 507,
315 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1982). It is not clear why this rationale also should not preclude
referendum consideration of minor rezonings having a minimal effect on the community.
151. See West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 467-68, 221 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(1974); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 324, 75 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1956), overruled, 210
Neb. 504, 507, 315 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1982); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts.,
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 537, 516 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1973); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1,
2, 394 P.2d 808, 808 (1964); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 849-50, 557
P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (1976) (en bane); see also Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo.
421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975).
152. Recent decisions have carried forward the logic of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915), holding
that the public deserves no specific procedural due process in the development of legislation. See Coufv. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982).
153. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d
290, 293-94 (1968) (en bane); Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140-41, 277
P. 308, 311-12 (1929) (en bane), overruled, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1976); San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.
Civ. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
154. But see Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557
P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976) (en bane) (notice and hearing requirements
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courts have found referendum zoning impermissible because the
authority to zone land had been granted exclusively from the state
legislature to local government bodies. 155
Since Eastlake, it is clear, however, that state courts have not been
discouraged from approving referendum zoning practices. Surprisingly, the Eastlake opinion has not served as a major theoretical support for the holdings in these cases. In general, the post-Eastlake
decisions have followed the same two-prdnged analytical structure
as had the cases decided prior to 1976.
A.

Jurisdictions Favoring Zoning Riferenda

The most well-developed line of decisions supporting land use
decisionmaking has come from the Supreme Court of California. 156
In San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council, that court
considered two fundamental questions: whether San Diego's city
charter precluded the use of the initiative for zoning matters and
whether the fourteenth amendment required notice and hearing
before enactment of zoning legislation. 157 San Diego voters had
adopted, by initiative, a thirty-foot height limitation ordinance
applying to all buildings constructed within a specifically defined

of California zoning statute inapplicable to instances of zoning by initiative); see also Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690 n.5 (1978)
(same).
155. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d
290, 293-94 (1968) (en bane); Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969);
San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
156. See, e.g., Arne! Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565,
169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980) (en bane); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (en
bane), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App.
3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978); see also Friends of Mt. Diablo v. County of Contra
Costa, 72 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1977). Of all of the states surveyed,
California has the largest volume of reported case law involving land use control by
plebiscite.
All of the reported California litigation concerns judicial review of voluntary citizen
initiatives; apparently the mandatory referendum system employed in Eastlake has never
confronted the California courts. It seems unlikely, however, that zoning by referendum
would receive different treatment than has land use control by citizen initiative. In fact,
one of the earliest reported California high court opinions concerning plebiscites and land
use control upheld a zoning referendum in Berkeley. See Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal.
505, 519, 253 P. 932, 938 (1927); see also Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826,
834, 323 P.2d 71, 75 (1958) (en bane).
157. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (en bane), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
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coastal zone area. 158 With respect to the first issue, Justice Tobriner
found that all legislative matters, including zoning, were encompassed within the general initiative power reserved by the San Diego
Charter. 159
The court devoted most of its effort, however, to the second question, specifically the allegation that adoption of local land use control ordinances by initiative procedure violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiff claimed that local government acts affecting private property interests must be preceded by
notice and hearing procedural elements to pass muster under federal
constitutional theory . 160 J u~tice Tobriner respnded with the proposition that the same notice and hearing procedures constitutionally
required to insure fairness in adjudicative or administrative decisions were not necessary to support government acts categorized
as legislative. 161 Adhering to this distinction and characterizing the
height limitation as ''unquestionably a legislative act,'' the California court refused to invalidate the San Diego initiative ordinance. 162
San Diego's significance is fourfold. First, it demonstrates the constitutional importance of the administrative/legislative dichotomy
and the differing rights associated with each classification, 163 a distinc-

158. ld. at 208 & n.1, 529 P.2d at 571 & n.1, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 147 & n.1.
159. ld. at 209, 529 P.2d at 572, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
160. ld. at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
161. ld. at 212, 529 P.2d at 573-74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (relying on Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Justice Tobriner quoted
extensively from Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915) (general democratic political control rather than due process theory properly limits
excesses of American government).
162. 13 Cal. 3d at 212, 218, 529 P.2d at 574, 578, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150, 154. The
court also rebuffed the plaintiff's argument that zoning legislation should be exempted
from the general "no due process" constitutional position because land use control has
a "substantial impact on real property values." ld. at 212, 529 P.2d at 574, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 150. Justice Tobriner correctly concluded that zoning ordinances were not the
only form of legislation that adversely could affect private property. !d. at 213, 529 P. 2d
at 574.-75, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
163. See id. at 211, 529 P. 2d at 5 73, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149. In subsequent cases, the
California courts have employed the adjudicative or administrative label to various local
government actions to make them ineligible for decision by plebiscite. In Friends of Mount
Diablo v. County of Contra Costa, the California court of appeals decided that a county board
of superviso~s resolution approving reorganization of a planned unit district was an
administrative, as opposed to a legislative, act and thus was outside the scope of the citizens'
referendum power. 72 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1008, 139 Cal. Rptr. 469, 470 (1977). County
approval of the reorganization involved "a matter of [such] statewide concern . . . as
to convert the local legislative body into an administrative agent of the state." !d. at 1010,
139 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (quoting Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 40, 48 n.14). In Horn v. County
of Ventura, the Supreme Court·of California ruled that a county's approval of a tentative
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tion material to the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Eastlake case. 164 Second, the decision reflects the California court's
willingness to distinguish between legislative and non-legislative
zoning actions and to extend direct electoral control only to the
former. By viewing zoning variances and conditional use permits
as administrative acts, the court recognized that formal differences
in regulatory action constitutes a valid basis for divergent procedural
rights. 165 Third, San Diego exemplifies a state supreme court fully
embracing the participatory democratic model for land use issues
and beginning to break free from the inhibiting effects of existing
state law precedent, 166 foreshadowing subsequent broad acceptance
of the principle of initiative control of community development policy
recognized in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore 167 and Arne[
Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa. 168 And fourth, Justice Tobriner's
opinion earns mention for its failure to consider the plaintiff's
challenge to the San Diego ordinance under any doctrine other than
federal constitutional law . 169
In 1976, California precedent concerning land use control by
plebiscite was extended significantly in Associated Home Builders v.
City of LivermoreY 0 The voters of Livermore, California considered
an initiative ordinance that placed a moratorium upon the issuance
of residential building permits until three public facilities performance criteria-education, sewage disposal and water supply-had

subdivision map was an "adjudicatory function" requiring reasonable notice and the
opportunity to be heard. 24 Cal. 3d 605, 610, 618, 596 P.2d 1134, 1136, 1138, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 718, 720, 724 (1979). Although this classification was not pronounced in a referendum case, arguably it implies that such subdivision approvals may not be subjected to
initiative or referendum treatment.
164. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1976).
165. See 13 Cal. 3d at 211-13, 529 P.2d at 573-74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. In his
concurrence in Horn, Justice Newman noted that the modern legislative process often entails the notice and hearing elements associated with administrative and adjudicative
decisionmaking. He cautioned that, in drawing a clear line between legislative and administrative decisions and subjecting only the latter to procedural due process requirements,
"we should not encourage legislators and rulemakers who conceivably yearn for a more
comfortable past-when often they did proceed [to enact legislation] without notice, without
hearing, in protective secrecy." 24 Cal. 3d at 621, 596 P.2d at 1143, 156 Cal. Rptr.
at 727 (Newman, J., concurring).
166. The San Diego decision anticipates the <;lemise of the Hurst v. City of Burlingame
precedent. See irifra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
167. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
168. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
169. The Supreme Court of California has not considered whether state constitutional
conceptions of due process might provide more extensive procedural rights to those persons adversely affected by referendum and initiative zoning decisions. See supra note 119.
170. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).

418

CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53.

been satisfied. 171 The factual setting of the Livermore case is typical
oflocal government efforts during the 1970's to control the development of suburban areas; Livermore's total prohibition of residential construction for an indefinite period, however, may be viewed
as one of the more extreme growth management devices. Speaking
through justice Tobriner, the court explicitly overruled a forty-sevenyear-old precedent that had precluded California cities from adopting
zoning ordinances by initiative. 172 Beginning with the premise that
the right to conduct a popular initiative is one that had been constitutionally reserved, as opposed to legislatively delegated, to the
citizenry, the court found that this fundamental political power need
not be subordinated to the procedural dictates of the California zon•
ing legislation. 173
The Livermore decision is strongly supportive of popular determination of community-wide land use policy. In fact, both the Livermore
and the San Diego fact patterns present situations in which general
issues of community development were decided by initiative vote.
In this respect, then, the California experience with land use
plebiscites has been limited to broad public issues that readily could
be considered proper subjects for legislation; treatment of the site
specific zoning matters addressed in the Eastlake case would be left
until a later day. Livermore did not consider seriously the effect of
the prohibitory initiative ordinance from the perspective of the
regulated landowner. The court's major concern was with the
substantive effect of the Livermore ordinance rather than with the
procedural method of its adoption. 174 Like the Supreme Court in
Eastlake, the California court approved the direct method of enacting
local legislation in sweeping terms and with little consideration of
the practical implications of the decision. 175
Taken together, San Diego and Livermore approved a broader use
of referenda for local land use decisions than did the Supreme Court
in Eastlake. And the state supreme court's holding in Arne! Develop-

171. !d. at 588, 557 P .2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. For specification of the stan·
dards, see id. at 590-91 & n.2, 557 P.2d at 476 & n.2, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44 & n.2.
172. /d. at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (overruling Hurst v. City of
Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929)).
173. /d. at 591, 596, 557 P.2d at 477, 480-81, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45, 48-49.
174. The court devoted most of its opinion to a discussion and subsequent rejection
of the plaintiff's constitutional arguments of vagueness, the impact upon the right to travel
and the breadth of the police power. /d. at 597-610, 557 P.2d at 481-89, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 49-57.
175. Even though Livermore was issued after Eastlake, it did not discuss whether its holding
would apply to zoning by referendum or initiative.
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ment Co. v. City of Costa Mesa applied the expansive principles of the
two prior cases to a zoning context. 176 Arne! involved a challenge
to a rezoning initiative that had blocked construction of a fifty-acre
single-family and apartment construction project. 177 Neighboring
property owners organized and circulated an initiative petition that
resulted in the rezoning of the subject parcel to an R -1 single family residential one. 178 The court considered the issue of whether rezoning by local initiative violates federal or state constitutional precepts
when the land involved is a small parcel or has a limited number
of owners. 179 With this question presented, the state supreme court
was asked to repudiate a substantial number of prior opinions and
to join the courts of several other states in viewing the limited-area
rezoning as an administrative or adjudicative act; 180 the majority
declined the invitation.
·The Arne! court adhered to California's classification of zoning
and rezoning as legislative acts and the proper subject of democratic
decisionmaking. 181 It explicitly found that rezoning by initiative did
not violate the due process clause of the federal Constitution. 182 One
of the few state court opinions discussing the Eastlake case, the opinion merely restates the positions taken by the Supreme Court concerning the federal constitutional issue. 183 Justice Tobriner stated
that the availability of administrative relief mechanisms plus the
potential for judicial review of the substantive zoning classification
were sufficient protection against any unfairness a zoning plebiscite
might exact against a landowner. 184 As a matter of state constitu-

176. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
177. /d. at 513, 620 P. 2d at 566, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The rezoning initiative involved three contiguous parcels of land with a combined area of 68 acres. Arnel's parcel
was 50 acres in size and had been rezoned in 1976 to accommodate 127 single-family
residences and 539 apartment units. The city had approved Arnel's development plan
and tentative tract map nearly a year prior to the passage of the rezoning initiative that
blocked construction of the project. !d. at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
Apparently Arne! had not come within the scope of the vested rights doctrine to enable
him to complete the project. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 144, §§ 6.11-.21; see, e.g.,
County ofKauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1982),
appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1762 ( 1983).
178. 28 Cal. 3d at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
179. !d. at 516, 620 P.2d at 567-68, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
180. !d. at 522 n.10, 620 P.2d at 571 n.10, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910 n.10 (citing West
v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,221 N.W.2d 303 (1974~; Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d
847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976)).
181. !d. at 522, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
182. !d. at 519-21, 620 P.2d at 570-71, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
183. !d., 620 P.2d at 570-71, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
184. /d. at 521, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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tional principle, Arnel reiterated San Diego's position. 185 The logic
of Justice Tobriner's constitutional analysis turned entirely upon
the legislative characterization of the initiative rezoning. Almost as
an afterthought, the majority opinion justified its generic classification of rezoning as an effort to assure interested parties concerning
matters of procedural rights and the availability of judicial review
for popularly adopted land regulation. 186 The court's automatic
labelling system effectively removed the question of classification
from the state's judiciary.
In Arnel, the Supreme Court of California fully embraced the
plebiscite as a legitimate method oflocalland use control, augmenting the Supreme Court's Eastlake view of direct democracy by
foreclosing any state constitutional due process cause of action ..
Perhaps the state's political tradition influenced the court's willingness to recognize and to uphold direct democratic decisionmaking.
The majority also genuinely may have believed that the owners affected would be protected by preexisting legal doctrines applicable
to all zoning decisions, 187 thus making state due process principles
duplicative and unnecessary. Obviously, Arnel's broad approval has
made California a leading jurisdiction supporting the referendum
zoning principle, inviting others to follow its example. 188
B.

Jurisdictions Unfavorable
to Zoning Referenda

The Supreme Court of Washington has enunciated the most.
extreme position rejecting zoning referenda. In Leonard v .. City of
Bothell, the court affirmed a denial of a writ of mandamus that would
have compelled city council to order a referendum election to consider a recent rezoning ordinance. 189 Under the facts, the owner
185. /d., 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (citing San Diego :J3ldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974)).
186. /d. at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911. The certainty borne by such
a system of automatic classification was believed to spare the state courts case-by-case
decision as to whether a zoning initiative or referendum was a legislative or adjudicative
act. /d., 620 P.2d at 572-73, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
18 7. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
188. Jurisdictions other than California support the use of the referendum zoning technique. See, e.g., Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981 ); Florida Land Co.
v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983); see also Ritchmount Partnership
v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978); Anne Arundel
County v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976). Ritchmount Partnership raises
an issue that is discussed infrequently: what happens when a popular referendum rejects
a rezoning ordinance?
189. 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (en bane).
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of a one-hundred-and-forty-one-acre parcel-originally zoned for
agricultural use-sought rezoning to build a regional shopping
center. 190 Pursuant to state law, a comprehensive environmental impact statement was prepared. The planning commission conducted
thirteen public meetings and ten public hearings on the rezoning
request; it later voted unanimously to rezone the area to allow the
intended use. 191 Thereafter, city council considered the matter at
twenty-four public meetings and two public hearings that had
followed a city-wide advisory ballot approving the rezoning
request. 192 Ultimately city council rezoned the property as requested,
precipitating the plaintiff's request to seek a referendum election
on the rezoning ordinance. 193
The Leonard case was considered on appeal after it had become
moot, reflecting the state supreme court's interest in the referendum zoning issue. 194 The court commenced its analysis with the
customary-and unexceptional-statement that referendum elections
were limited to those acts of governmental bodies that are legislative
in nature. 195 But application of this classification principle to the
zoning and rezoning context produced an unusual result. The
majority conceded that the initial adoption of the zoning code and
a comprehensive zaning plan constituted a legislative policymaking
act. 196 By comparison, however, amendments of a zoning ordinanee
were characterized as mere implem.entations of the zoning code, properly considered part of the administrative function. 197 Thus, the
Leonard court viewed rezonings. as adjudications that balance the
rights of competitors in a quasi-judicial context. 198 Viewing the
matter in this light, the majority found that "[t]he ordinance merely
rezoned the property and modified the language of the plan to reflect
the anticipated land-use change. We do not view the ordinance as
190. /d. at 848, 557 P.2d at 1307.
191. /d., 557 P.2d at 1307.
192. /d., 557 P.2d at 1308.
193. /d., 557 P.2d at 1308.
194. Justice Hamilton noted that this case involved a matter of substantial public interest and warranted treatment other than mere dismissal. /d. at 849, 557 P.2d at 1308.
195. /d. at 849-50, 557 P.2d at 1308.
196. /d. at 850, 557 P.2d at 1309 (citing Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d
292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en bane)).
197. /d., 557 P.2d at 1309. Such a stance broke no new ground for the Washington
court given that three recent cases had adopted the same view. See Barrie v. Kitsap County,
84 Wash. 2d 579, 586,527 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1974) (en bane); Fleming v. City of Tacoma,
81 Wash. 2d 292, 299,502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (en bane); Buell v. City of Bremerton,
80 Wash. 2d 518, 524, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1972) (en bane).
198. 87 Wash. 2d at 850-51, 557 P.2d at 1309.
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a legislative policy-making decision, and thus it is not subject to
a referendum election. " 199 Of course, this result ignored the fact
that the developer intended to convert a one-hundred-and-forty-oneacre parcel from low to extremely high intensity use. Even if small
area rezonings might be considered the proper subject for adjudication, a rezoning of this magnitude would seem instead better suited
for a broad, legislative policymaking decision. Apparently, the court
wished to maintain a uniform position against subjecting rezoning
decisions to referendum control. 200
Leonard concluded its analysis with discussion of an element raised
by Justice Stevens in his dissent to the Eastlake decision. 201 The
Washington court emphasized that rezoning decisions ''require an
informed and intelligent choice by individuals who possess the
expertise to consider the total economic, social and physical
characteristics of the community.' ' 202 Such reasoned decisionmaking
obviously is absent from a system that demands only a "yes" or
"no" decision on complex issues. And although the Leonard court
did not require, as a matter of state constitutional principle, this
kind of informed decisionmaking, it did voice its approval of the
city's thorough analysis of the consequences of the rezoning proposal. Undoubtedly, the Leonard holding represents a different view
of a local government's land use control functions than do the other
cases sustaining referendum zoning. 203

IV.

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSis oF REFERENDUM ZoNING IN
CuYAHOGA CouNTY, OHIO

This section of the Article examines the referendum zoning techniques used by municipalities within Cuyahoga County, Ohio between
1962 and 1982. This area was selected because of its geographical
size, varied population density and number of municipal governments. Within the county there are sixty local governments, each
possessing either home rule or general law powers. As stated above,
Ohio constitutional, statutory and case law encourages the use of
199. !d. at 851, 557 P.2d at 1309.
200. See id. at 851-52, 557 P.2d at 1309-10 (quoting Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319,
75 N.W.2d 713 (1956), overruled, 210 Neb. 504, 315 N.W.2d 628 (1982)).
201. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 693 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
202. 87 Wash. 2d at 854, 557 P.2d at 1311.
203. Jurisdictions other than Washington disfavor the use of the referendum zoning
technique. See, e.g., Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214
(1983); San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
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plebiscites by permitting legislative matters to be initiated by citizen
petition and to be reviewed by referendum. The variety of municipal
ordinance or charter provisions that subject land use control decisions to the vote of the electorate will be noted, as will patterns
developed as a consequence of using the referendum zoning system.
A.

An Overview of Charter Provisions

Empirical analysis began by a review of the municipal ordinances
and charter provisions, with special attention paid to their treatment of referendum and initiative matters. Because there is no central registry of local legislation, direct inquiry was made of each
municipal office and each law director. This survey revealed the
pervasiveness of referendum zoning within Cuyahoga County. Mandatory referendum requirements were found in nineteen of sixty
municipalities. 204 Within these nineteen jurisdictions, local law required that a wide range of land use control decisions be subject
to referendum approval prior to taking effect. Ordinances in a
number of other communities simply stated that their citizens possessed all of the rights with respect to initiatives and referenda as conferred by state law. In these instances, the popular right to review
locally enacted legislation or to originate new proposals becomes
a voluntary matter dependent upon sufficient voter interest to support full electoral consideration. It also was apparent from the survey
that the Eastlake decision had not caused the immediate adoption
of referendum zoning legislation. In fact, a number of the jurisdictions adopted their referendum schemes during the early 1970s,
subsequent to the Supreme Court's opinion in James v. Valtierra. 205
As a general proposition, there was no geographical, or size, pattern to the distribution of the mandatory zoning referendum ordinances throughout the county.
204. Within the county there were 19 municipalities that had referendum zoning provisions in their charters or ordinances. Cities: (1) BAY VILLAGE, OHIO, CHARTER art. VII,
§ 7 .6; (2) BRECKSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 12; (3) BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, OHIO,
CHARTER art. IX; (4) FAIRVIEW PARK, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 16; (5) GARFIELD HEIGHTS,
OHIO, CHARTER § 58; (6) HIGHLAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, CHARTER art. VIII, § 8.02.02; (7)
INDEPENDENCE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, §§ 5d-5e; (8) MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS, Omo,
CHARTER (no section given); (9) NoRTH OLMSTED, Omo, CHARTER art. VII, § 2e; (10)
PARMA, Omo, ordinance issue 38; (11) PEPPER PIKE, Omo, CHARTER art. VIII,§ 1; (12)
SEVEN HILLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. XIV; (13) SoLON, Omo, CHARTER art. XIV; (14)
STRONGSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 6(h); (15) WESTLAKE, OHIO, CHARTER § 13.
Villages: (16) CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. X, § 4; (17) MAYFIELD, Omo, CHARTER
art. III, § 14; (18) MoRELAND HILLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. VIII, § 2; and (19) ORANGE,
Omo, CHARTER art. III, §§ 13-14.
205. 402
137 (1971).

u.s.
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The substance of the language appearing in charter and ordinance
provisions demonstrates numerous approaches. First, as mentioned,
many jurisdictions were found to have no legislation specifically dealing with plebiscites; therefore, they implicitly recognize the rights
conferred to citizens by the Ohio constitution and relevant statutes. 206
Second, some localities merely acknowledged the state-granted rights
to initiative and referendum in their local ordinances. 207 These provisions were general in scope and did not focus on the application
of referenda and initiatives to land use decisionmaking. Third, a
number of municipalities subjected all zoning classification, district
and use change ordinances to confirmation by mandatory
referenda, 208 reminiscent of that construed in Eastlake. 209 However,
some jurisdictions have modified this type of ordinance to require
that all zoning changes, both legislative and administrative, undergo
mandatory voter approval. 21 ° Fourth, five of the communities
sampled had coupled a "ward veto" provision with their mandatory
zoning referendum requirements, granting veto power over land

206. See supra note 135.
207. For example, the Lyndhurst, Ohio charter provides that "[o]rdinances and other
measures may be proposed by initiative petition and adopted by election, and ordinances
and other measures adopted by the Council shall be subject to referendum, to the extent
and in the matter now or hereafter provided by the Constitution or the Laws of Ohio.''
LYNDHURST, OHio, CHARTER art. VIII, § 1.
208. The Village of Chagrin Falls provides in its charter that:
No ordinance which provides for a change in the existing municipal zoning map
or which otherwise provides for a change in the use of property from the uses
presently authorized by the existing zoning code shall become effective until referred
to the Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County for submission to the electors and
approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon at the next succeeding general
election, in any year occurring subsequent to 90 days after the approval of such
ordinance by the Mayor, or the overriding by Council of the disapproval whichever
occurs later.
CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. X, § 4.
209. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 686 n.8 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
210. The city charter of Solon, Ohio provides a good example of this:
An ordinance, resolution, or other action, whether legislative or administrative
in nature, effecting a change in the zoning classification or district of any property within the City of Solon, Ohio, shall not become effective after the passage
thereof, until Council submits such ordinance, resolution or other action to the
electorate at a regularly scheduled election.
SoLON, OHio, CHARTER art. XIV, § 1.
Several other charter provisions seem to track this language rather closely. The extension to include administrative land use control modification plainly appears to be unauthorized in light of the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in Forest City Enter. v. City
of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The
Solon charter section was approved by the voters shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Eastlake.
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use changes to the voters in the election.ward in which the subject
land was located. 211 Because exercise of this veto vests ultimate
legislative power in a narrow segment of the community, such a
provision runs contrary to the direct holding of the Eastlake majority. Fifth, several localities limited their mandatory referendum requirements to zoning changes that would facilitate the construction
of multifamily housing construction designed to exceed a predetermined height limitation, or when the number of multifamily units
within the municipality exceeds a preset percentage of all dwellings
in the town. 212 Such selective application of the referendum requirement to these multifamily residential land uses demonstrates the
potential of referendum zoning as a not so subtle variant of exclusionary zoning. 213 Although such a categorization probably would
not violate fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection principles, it might be unlawful within the context of the Fair
Housing Act. 214 Sixth, several localities specifically required that
the applicant for the zoning change pay the costs associated with
the conduct of the mandatory referendum, undoubtedly deterring
all but the most solvent landowners from even seeking zoning
changes. 215
This survey indicates that the basic requirement to refer zoning
211. The ward veto system vests a great deal of power in relatively few people. For
example, in the Fairview Park, Ohio charter "an ordinance . . . effecting a change in
the uses permitted in any zoning use classification or district ... shall not become effective after the passage thereof, until Council submits such ordinance ... to the electorate
at a regularly scheduled election, occurring more than sixty (60) days after the ordinance,
resolution, or other action is approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, in
his Municipality and in each ward in which the change is applicable to property in the
ward." See FAIRVIEW PARK, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 16(b). In this jurisdiction, the
referendum requirement and ward veto provision also apply to zoning legislation initiated
by the voters. /d. § 16(c).
212. Several of the mandatory referral ordinances were focused specifically on the perceived problem of increasing multifamily residential units within the jurisdiction. For example, those phrased in terms of percentage include: NoRTH OLMSTED, OHIO, CHARTER
art. VII, § 2( e) (20% ); STRONGSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 6(h) (15% ). Mandatory
referenda delimited by height provisions include: MAYFIELD, OHIO, CHARTER art. III,
§ 12; ORANGE, OHIO, CHARTER art. III, § 14. A final category of provisions requires the
referendum approval any time zoning or rezoning is designed to provide for multifamily
dwellings; here, the nature of the proposed new use of land is all important. See INDEPENDENCE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § (d).
213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
214. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified,
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S 926 (1982), discussed supra note 130.
215. See, e.g., NoRTH OLMSTED, OHIO, CHARTER art. VII, § 2(e) ("[T]he applicant
agrees to assume all costs of the special election (on the referendum zoning issue) including
advertising, and further posts a bond with the Director of Finance of the City of North
Olmsted.").
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changes to the electorate for ratification or rejection has been
embellished considerably by the ordinances of some localities. The
embellishments observed in this Ohio county also reflect the quality
of legal counsel available to these local governments; several of the
features of these referendum zoning provisions either are of dubious
validity or plainly are unlawful. Apparently, no attempts were made
to revise local legislation to comport with the demands of federal
or state supreme court judgments. Perhaps inadvertence explains
local counsels' failure to recommend the reformation of ordinance
and charter provisions, but inaction may represent a conscious attempt to ignore the prevailing legal principles until a lawsuit is
threatened. In any event, the survey no doubt reflects the reality
that local governments do not embrace immediately the rulings of
judicial authorities and that specific provisions of local law often
lag behind the direct 'commands of the courts. Beyond this, the
referendum zoning requirements studied reflect a general attitude
favoring citizen control over changes in the nature of the local community. They reflect a lack of trust in the judgment of local elected
officials and an implicit desire to reinforce existing land use patterns.
B.

Evaluation of Referendum
Zoning Results

The research project examined Cuyahoga County election records
from 1962 to 1982 to determine how referenda and initiatives were
used to make land use control decisions. The study sought data on
a range of matters related to the subject of referendum zoning, the
frequency of occurrence, the distribution of occurrence, the types
of issues subjected to voter approval by plebiscite, and the rates of
success and failure of land use subjects over time.
As the table below indicates, 216 the total number of land use
216. All Referenda on Land Use Matters
Total

1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971

0
0
16
23
13
15
9
8
12
9
17
4

Successful

0
0
15
19
12
1
6
4

5
5
6
4

Success Rate

82%
95%
92%
66%
66%
50%
41%
55%
35%
100%
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referenda 217 generally grew; the peak-an average of nearly eighteen
per year-occurred from 197 7 through 1980. An increased adoption of mandatory zoning provisions following the Supreme Court's
decisions in Valtierra and Eastlake may explain the peak. 218 Over the
entire duration of the research, however, the average frequency was
far less; slightly greater than seven referenda per year. Oddly enough,
during 1981 and the first half of 1982, no zoning matters were decided
by public vote. Considering the size of Cuyahoga County and the
number of local governments included in it, the data gathered
describe a land use control technique remarkably underutilized.
Attempted zoning changes by voter initiative were far less frequent. Over the same study period, there were thirty-five initiatives
compared to one hundred and fifty-two referenda. 219 This discre-

1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962

7
0
1
2
0
6
4
1
5

3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4

42%

152

93

61.2%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
80%

217. The survey of county records indicated that a variety of land use control issues
were placed on the ballot besides the automatic referral of rezoning and other regulatory
relief requests. For instance, localities used the referendum technique to (1) change the
definition of residential use as it pertained to home offices; (2) change procedural requirements for zoning administration; (3) alter the composition of zoning boards; (4)
eliminate washing of vehicles as a permitted use for automotive facilities; (5) adopt comprehensive planning documents; and (6) amend minimum side yard requirements. The
vast majority of referenda, however, were held to determine whether a particular parcel
of land should be rezoned to a different use classification.
218. In the period following the Supreme Court's decision in Valtierra, the following
12 municipalities adopted mandatory referendum zoning provisions: Bay Village (May
7, 1974, general); Broadview Heights (Nov. 2, 1976, general); Fairview Park (Nov. 4,
1975, general); Garfield Heights (Nov. 8, 1977, general); Highland Heights (Nov. 5, 1974,
general); Independence (Nov. 8, 1977, general); North Royalton (May 2, 1972, multifamily
only); Pepper Pike (May 7, 1974, general); Seven Hills (Nov. 2, 1976, general); Solon
(Nov. 8, 1977, general); Strongsville (Nov. 4, 1980, multifamily only); and Westlake (Nov.
6, 1973, multifamily only). It would seem that the Supreme Court's support for land use
plebiscites influenced a large number of municipalities to adopt mandatory referral
provisions.
219. All Initiatives on Land Use Matters
Total
1982
1981
1980

Successful

0
0

0
0

2

2

Success Rate

100%
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pancy is understandable; initiatives require citizens to form an
organization concerned with a particular issue and to collect a sufficient number of signatures to have the question placed on the
ballot. 220 Such an undertaking requires a level of personal commitment to a land use issue that ordinarily can be mustered only in
a limited number of instances. Initiatives, in addition to being less
numerous than zoning referenda, fail to demonstrate the same increasing pattern of frequency over the study period as did zoning
referenda. The distribution of all land use control initiatives over
the twenty-year period was relatively uniform, averaging slightly
less than two per year. But during the 1962-1982 period, only fourteen of these initiatives were for specific rezoning requests. Thus,
rezoning by initiative has been used less frequently to. circumvent
the traditional governmental zoning process.
Undoubtedly the most important data derived were those concerning the success or failure of matters presented for direct voter
decision through the referendum or initiative mechanism. Over the
study period, land use referenda were successful sixty-one percent
of the time, while initiatives-at forty-eight percent-enjoyed a lower
degree of success. If the analysis were limited to referenda and initiatives concerned solely with single parcel rezonings, the success
ratio drops to forty-eight percent and twenty-one percent
respectively. 221 These results hardly reflect a picture of complete

1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962

1

0
3
2
3
6
4

0
0
2
2
1
1

0
4

2
0
3
0
0
2

1

1

0

0

1

3
1

1

1

2

0
0
0

1

0

0%
66%
100%
33%
16%
50%
0%
100%
0%
50%
100%
100%
0%
0%

48%
17
35
220. See 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, at 730.
221 . Referenda Concerning the Rezoning of a Single Parcel of Land
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citizen hostility to all zoning changes. But it must be remembered
that most of the unsuccessful referendum proposals would have been

1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961

Total

Successful

0
12
14
3
6
6
3
5
4
7
1
4
0
0
2
0
7
3
0
2
0

0
11
13
2
4
3
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

79

38

Success Rate

91%
93%
66%
66%
50%
0%
0%
50%
14%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
50%
48.1%

Initiatives Concerning the Rezoning of a Single Parcel of Land
Total

1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961

Successful

0
1
1
0
1
0
1
3
0
1
0
1
0
3
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

14

3

Success Rate

10%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
33%
100%

0%

21%
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enacted into local law absent the plebiscite requirement. As the tables
presented reveal, 222 there has been great variation in the annual success rates of the rezoning plebiscites. For instance, from 1961 through
1970, only one referendum and two initiative proposals were approved out of a total of twenty-four conducted. Yet the time from·
1971 through 1980 saw both an increased frequency and a higher
success ratio for zoning referenda: thirty-seven of sixty-one rezoning
proposals won approval. In contrast, rezoning by citizen initiative
during this decade was markedly less successful: only one victory.
The recent high success rate is puzzling given its tendency to refute
claims that zoning referenda represent a sophisticated exclusionary
land use technique. Moreover, it suggests that the mandatory referral
system largely confirms decisions previously made by city councils
on matters of land use policy. As such, it unnecessarily adds time
delay and administrative and project costs to the process. In light
of these conclusions, one must question whether the costs of the
referendum zoning system imposed upon the municipality and the
landowner are justified by the benefits accruing to the community.

C.

Observations Concerning Referendum Zoning in Cuyahoga County

A number of conclusions follow from the results of the Cuyahoga
County study. First, the automatic referral system adopted
throughout the county was much more pervasive than was originally
anticipated. Nearly one-third of all the municipalities within this
county require some or all zoning changes to be ratified by positive
vote of the electorate. Still, a number of zoning referenda identified
by the research were conducted in jurisdictions that did not
automatically refer zoning matters to the voters. Specific issues,
therefore, were submitted for public approval simply because sufficient numbers of citizens petitioned their local governments to call
for a vote of the electorate. In context, however, the automatic referral and the voluntary referenda did not constitute a large number
of zoning matters in the abstract. Considering the population count,
geographic size and large number of political jurisdictions within
the study area, it is somewhat surprising that there were so few rezonings actually referred to the citizens for approval. This observation possibly means that land developers both used their property
in consonance with existing zoning classifications and sought infrequent deviations from existing regulations. A more likely explanation posits that techniques probably were developed that" escaped

222. See supra notes 216 and 219.
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automatic referendum requirements contained in local charters or
ordinances. For instance, use of an emergency declarati,on attached
to a piece of municipal legislation effectively would shield a rezoning matter from the requirement of referendum approval. This
technique and others may have circumvented the technical requisites
of the referendum zoning provisions of local law.
Second, an interesting side issue emerges. The study reveals that
the referendum requirement has been applied to land parcels of varying sizes. This means, of course, that the rezoning of a one-acre
parcel from single-family to duplex use might require validation by
referendum just as a seventy-eight-acre parcel would. Often the election records did not reveal the exact size of the parcel beil).g considered; but when that information was provided, it was clear that
zoning referenda were required for both small and large lots.
Apparently size was not a determinative factor in presenting the
land use issue before the electorate.
Finally, no clear pattern regarding the success or failure of rezoning matters was discernible. At best, one can only conclude that
the data does not permit stereotyping with respect to public acceptance. Although there seemed to be a general trend against the approval of rezonings from a less intensive to a more intensive land
use classification, even this generality did not always bear itself out.
Cuyahoga County's election records did not reveal consistent
opposition to new commercial or multifamily land uses within the ·
community. Nor did the review indicate that the referendum zoning techniques had been used as exclusionary devices insulating
localities from unwanted residents or development. It is, however,
impossible to estimate the number of development proposals requiring zoning changes that never advanced to the rezoning stage simply
because a referendum requirement existed. Such deterrence is a subtle, yet largely unquantifiable, result of the technique.
V.

CoNCLUSION

The prior observations concerning referendum zoning are not intended to indicate that the device is a desirable or even innocuous
local government technique. The Supreme Court's holding in Eastlake
significantly reinforces the legitimacy of this technique within the
land use control context. Many states have adopted legislation and
judicial positions consistent with the Eastlake view. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court's support reflects an unrealistic view of local
government affairs and the value of local democratic expression.
For example, as practiced in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, referendum zoning subjects both major and minor zoning decisions to voter
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approval, showering minor rezonings with the same attention warranted by and given to significant questions of community development policy. Furthermore, a review of the election records suggests
that the issues presented to the public are not explained clearly by
the formal language appearing upon the voter's. ballot. The ballot
language employed for land use referenda within the study area was
confusing and occasionally incomprehensible. If zoning referenda
are to be encouraged as an enlightened form of participatory
democracy, an interested voter plainly cannot form an educated opinion on the electoral issue based solely upon ballot language. If ballot
language is t.he primary source of information on a land use issue,
the voter will have merely the most superficial understanding of the
question presented. In addition, the Cuyahoga County survey reveals
that voter participation in land use referenda has been very low.
Obviously, then, a relatively small percentage of the eligible voters
within the jurisdiction determine whether a development proposal
will proceed. In fact, in those jurisdictions having referendum zoning
systems with the ward veto feature, a mere handful of voters can
reject a proposal even if the overwhelming majority within the locality
wishes to approve it. In this instance, the referendum zoning
mechanism is conspicuously undemocratic.
What of the quality of the decisions referendum zoning renders?
Arguably a minor rezoning issue ought not be subjected to referendum approval given its limited impact upon the community. For
this reason, a number of western states have categorized such rezonings as administrative actions, thereby removing them frorri the
referendum approval requirement. And, for a different reason, large
scale rezoning questions may not be well-suited to referendum approval. These significant developmental changes present complex
questions of social and economic policy for the local community.
It seems particularly inappropriate for such a complicated matter
to be determined on the basis of a "yes" or "no" decision. A
majority vote does not necessarily reflect a ,rational choice on the
matter under consideration. Ironically, the referendum requirement
actually denies meaningful public participation in the selection of
future community growth policy. By requiring referendum approval
for these decisions, the ability to establish community goals and to
implement them through legislative action is withdrawn from the
popularly elected representatives. The significance of public debate
before legislative bodies on matters of importance to the community
is drastically lessened. Mandatory referendum zoning effectively
devalues the practice of open and full discussion of important community issues in a public forum. In essence, referendum zoning limits
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public debate on complex public issues by providing the simple alternative of approval or disapproval and decentralizes public responsibility for important decisionmaking.
A related criticism of the referendum zoning technique is that
it reflects a basic distrust of local elected officials and the representative system of government. By installing the plebiscite as a check
against the malfeasance or nonfeasance of these officials, the community has established that it does not believe that legislative decisions merit citizen respect. It appears that the referendum zoning
system relegates the city council to the role of a "super" planning
commission-one that makes advisory recommendations to the
public at large for ratification. There should be less drastic ways
to control the behavior of local legislative officers, with removal at
the next regularly scheduled election serving as the most direct
method.
Beyond the impact of referendum zoning upon the ·integrity of
the locallegi~lative decisionmaking process is its effect upon the work
of city planners and planning commissions. Few judicial opinions
have accorded much attention to this factor, despite the fact that
referendum zoning seriously interferes with a system that recognizes
and takes advantage of city planner expertise. The traditional structure of rezoning practice usually requires that a proposal receive
approval from the municipality's planning staff, the community's
planning commission and, finally, the locality's elected officials.
Regrettably, the referendum technique reduces the incentive for
thorough project evaluation by planning officials. Further, the longterm effect of referendum zoning may be to freeze the existing
municipal zoning map, given that changes must run the gauntlet
of electoral approval.
This stultifying effect could have longlasting implications for community growth and development. The process of community planning and land use regulation is a dynamic one. Referendum zoning
seemingly would force a municipality to adhere to conceptions of
desirable community form and zoning structure not because they
represent the best plan for local growth, but rather because they
constitute a known and accepted use of the land within the locality.
In this sense, the adoption of mandatory referendum zoning
represents an impressive, conservative force in local affairs. Prior
to embracing a doctrine encouraging referendum zoning as a means
of increasing citizen involvement in the affairs of local government,
states and localities must understand fully the less attractive implications of the technique.

